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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
- vs LOREN CRAIG SIMS,
Defend ant-Appellant.

Case No.
12828

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case was a criminal action brought by the State
of Utah against defendant-appellant, Loren Craig Sims,
charging him with the crime of murder in the first degree in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-30-73 ( 1953),
as amended, under the clause of that section referred to
as the felony-murder rule.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District,
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the 13th
day of November, 1971, the jury found the defendantappellant guilty of murder in the first degree and recommended that he be imprisoned at hard labor for life. On
December 3, 1971, defendant-appellant was sentenced
to imprisonment at hard labor in the Utah State Prison
for life.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming the
verdict and judgment rendered by the jury at the trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with appellant's statement of the
facts with the following inclusions and exceptions. As to
the prosecution's witnesses:

1. Charlene Patterson testified that she did not touch
appellant while he drove her to the hospital (T. 240).
She further testified that her apartment had no doorbell
and that she and Carla Hogan knocked on the door
(T. 192).
2. Carla Hogan testified that when she and Charlene Patterson arrived at the Patterson apartment the
door was locked (T. 275).
3. Respondent agrees with the statement of the fact
in appellant's paragraph 3.
4. Dr. Weston testified that with only the knowledge
that rigor mortis had set in, he could make no guess at
the time of death (T. 439). He also indicated that during his examination of the body, he noticed no rigor
mortis (T. 438).
5. When appellant came into the frontroom after
his mother awakened him, he was wearing only his shorts
and levis. John Bernardo testified not that he saw a black
turtleneck sweater but that he saw a black turtleneck
T-Shirt ( T. 491-492).
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6. Respondent agrees with the facts in number 6.
7. Respondent agrees with the facts in number 7.
8. Robert E. Neill testified not only that the nylon
fiber on the levi jacket recovered from the defendant
"could have originated from exhibit 23" but that the
fiber was identical to that found on exhibit 23 (T. 598).
Mr. Neill also testified that the fibers discussed would
not travel more than one foot through the air (T. 614)
and that such fibers have less likelihood of a secondary
transfer than a primary one (T. 608). He also stated
that the nylon fibers from the second upholstery sample
and the coat lining were not similar to the nylon fibers
found on appellant's shorts, levis and levi jacket (T. 1134
and 1137).
9. Gerald Patterson said that appellant first asked
"is your mom here" (T. 341 and 360). Gerald also testified that he did not lock the apartment door after the
appellant left (T. 343 and 364-365).
10. Respondent generally agrees with the facts as
presented in paragraph 10.
As to the defense witnesses:
A. Helen Steyl testified that Sims was wearing a
black turtleneck T-Shirt on that evening (T. 793 and
795). She indicated that she could not remember the
other times during that week when Sims had come into
the Sandpiper Lounge (T. 799). John Bernardo testified
that this witness told him on the phone on the 27th of
March that she was just guessing at the time the appellant entered the lounge (T. 1164).
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B. John Bernardo testified that he remembered and
had notes (T. 1170) of a conversation with Ethel Sims
on the 23rd of March in which she told him that she
did not hear the appellant come in that evening, that
she was taking medication and seldom heard him come
in ( T. 1165) .

C. Loren Sims testified that appellant took a bath
before leaving at 9: 00 p.m. on the 22nd of March (T.
834). He also indicated he saw his son when his son was
up at 3: 00 a.m. the morning of March 23 (T. 836).
Loren Sims indicated he did not sleep the night of the
23rd (T. 837). He later said that appellant never got
up during the night (T. 865-866). He also admitted that
at a previous hearing he had testified that after going
to bed he did not hear the floor squeak, he did not see
the appellant again that night, he did not hear the water
taps in the kitchen and did not see any lights on in the
kitchen (T. 878-879).
D. Lucille Ercanbrack testified she did not get out
of bed to look out the window (T. 911). She said the
first time she looked out the window she saw a man
dressed in white (T. 912) who was gone when she heard
the knocking noise again and looked out the window a
second time ( T. 912) . Charlene Patterson testified she
did not see any such man dressed in white in the parking
lot that evening; and that the only person besides herself
and Rosella Bird were some neighbors and a cab driver
who had come to drop them off (T. 249-250). Officers
N. D. Hayward (T. 934-936), William Oefinger (T.
1160-1162) and Benjamin Forbes ( T. 11 77) testified
they received no report of a man in white clothes and

5
that when they questioned Mrs. Ercanbrack about seeing anyone when she heard the knocking or banging
noise, she replied she had seen no one.
E. Elissa Snow testified the act of intercourse only
took about five minutes (T. 1117). The inference that
the blood from her toe got on appellant's levis does not
appear valid when the blood stain was on the left knee
of the levis (T. 578).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY ADMITTING TESTIMONY OF SHERIFF'S
DEPUTIES AS TO WHAT THEY SAW IN APPELLANT'S
BEDROOM WHILE ACCOMPANYING APPELLANT TO GET
DRESSED.

When the Sheriff's deputies were in appellant's bedroom, they conducted no search. The Supreme Court
of the United States has spoken directly to the question
at hand in the case of Harris v. United States, 390 U.S.
234, 236, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968) wherein they stated:
"It has long been settled that objects falling
into the plain view of an officer who has a right
to be in the position to have that view are subject
to seizure and may be introduced into evidence."
The first issue to be discussed, therefore, concerns
whether the officers had a right to be in appellant's bedroom while he was getting dressed. An examination of
the trial court transcript should clarify that problem.
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Sometime between nine or ten in the morning, four
officers were sent to the home of appellant as part of a
routine investigation. Detective John Bernardo, Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Office, testified as to what occurred:
MR. BANKS: Q. And how did you get into the
living room?
MR. BERNARDO: A. We knocked on the front
door, Mr. Sims' mother answered the door. We
identified ourselves and asked if Craig was home.
She said he was in bed, that she would get him,
and invited us in. (T. 322).

*

*

*

Q. Was he dressed or undressed when he came
into the living room?

A. He had on a pair of levis is all he had on.

Q. At that time was he advised to any of his
constitutional rights?

A. Yes Sir. (T. 322).

*

*

*

(The transcript then reveals that the Miranda warning was read to him by Detective Forbes verbatim.)
MR. BARBER: Q. When you gave Mr. Sims his
rights, did you ask him whether he understood
them?
MR. BERNADO: A. I didn't give him his right.

Q. When Forbes did?
A. Yes.
Q. And what did Sims say?
A. In the exact words, as I recall, were, "Would
you like to talk to us?"
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Q. And what did Sims say?
A. Yes. (T. 335).
By saying "yes" to a request to talk to officers following
a complete enumeration of the Miranda rights, appellant
clearly waived them. A more in depth analysis of this
issue follows in Point II.
After consenting to go with the officers down to the
Shop, Sims said he would have to get his clothes on.
MR. BANKS: Q. Now, did he leave the living
room after that request?
MR. BERNARDO: A. He was going to the bedroom. Yes.

Q. All right. And at the time, was anything said
to him?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was said and by whom?
A. I asked him if we could go with him to his
bedroom.

Q. And did he reply?
A. Yes. (T. 347-348).
Appellant's response to that question is not recorded
but was recognized by counsel on both sides as being in
the affirmative.
While within the bedroom by consent of appellant,
Detective Bernardo saw something in plain view about
which he subsequently testified.

In an effort to find whether a search was actually
conducted by the officers, counsel for Sims attempted to
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get Detective Bernardo to admit to having done more
than merely looking around at what was in plain view.
At this, counsel failed (T. 359).
The failure to establish that a search was conducted
brings the entire issue outside of the context of the points
discussed by appellant in his brief.
Case law in support of respondent's contention is
abundant.
In the case of Chapman v. United States, 346 F.2d
383 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. den. 382 U.S. 909, 86 S.Ct.
249, 15 L.Ed.2d 161, officers entered a home by invitation while investigating a robbery of papers from a
bank. On the floor of the front room they saw scattered
papers and charred papers in the fireplace. Testimony
concerning what they saw was allowed. There the court
said at 386-387:
"Admittedly, up to the time that the officers,
voluntarily admitted to appellant's premises, saw
the documents on the floor of her home which
had been taken from the bank after her termination of employment, they had suspicions only, and
no sufficient evidence to arrest the appellant, or
to obtain a warrant to search her premises.

*

*

*

"Appellant, in oral argument, equates the two
or three steps taken by an officer to the fireplace
to "a search." We do not. It is not a search for
an officer to observe (once lawfully near or on
and within premises) that which is clearly and
plainly to be seen, even if he uses searchlights or
field glasses. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559,
47 S.Ct. 746, 71L.Ed1202 (1927)."
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In Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir.
1964), officers were invited into a home and saw some
wastebaskets containing marijuana. There the court said
on page 305:
. "However, once legally inside the room, the
officers were not required to remain blind to the
obvious. . . . It is well established that it is not a
search to observe what is open and patent either
in daylight or in artificial light. United States v.
Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 47 S.Ct. 746, 71 L.Ed. 1202;
Boyd v. United States, 4 Cir., 286 F. 930; Smith v.
United States, 4 Cir., 2 F.2d 715; Safarik v.
United States, 8 Cir., 62 F.2d 892, 895 * * *. Petteway v. United States, 261 F.2d 53, 54 (4 Cir.
1958)."
And in another Federal Court the same conclusion
was reached. In United States v. Atkinson, 450 F.2d 835
(5th Cir. 1971), we read:
"The judge's conclusion is in accord with our
decisions that items in plain view of law enforcement officers who have a legitimate right to be in
a position to have that view are not discovered as
a result of a search. Walker v. Beto, 437 F.2d 1018
(5th Cir. 1971); Agius v. United States, 413 F.2d
915, reh. denied 417 F.2d 635, cert. denied 397
U.S. 992, 90 S.Ct. 1116, 25 L.Ed. 2d 399 (5th
Cir. 1969); Grimes v. United States, 405 F.2d 477
(5th Cir. 19 68) . We can find in the record before
us no reason to upset his conclusion. We therefore
need not reach the question of whether Atkinson
consented to the search, since non occurred."
Id. at 839.
This Court in the case of State v. Martinez, 23 Utah
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2d 62, 457 P.2d 613 (1969) cited a quotation in footnote
5 on page 615 which reads:
" 'No search under the constitutional interdiction takes place when items having evidentiary
are outside a building and in plain view,
if they are in plain sight inside a building to
which access has been lawfully gained. * * *'
State v. Martin, 73 Wash. 2d 616, 440 P.2d 429,
433 ( 1968); also see State v. Allred, 16 Utah 2d
41, 44, 395 P.2d 535 (1964)."
The facts of our case bring it clearly within the scope
of the decisions cited supra.
Having legally gained access to appellant's home and
bedroom, officers could not be prevented from testifying
concerning what came to their attention in plain view.
No consent to search was necessary since no search was
conducted. The only consent necessary was that degree
necessary to legally be in the home and the bedroom. The
specificity required for this degree of consent is far less
than for something like a consent to search, and here,
the requisite requirements to be legally on the premises
were met. The trial judge was not in error in allowing
the testimony of deputies as to that which was seen by
them at that time.
POINT II
INTRODUCTION OF STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT AT HIS HOME ON THE MORNING OF MARCH
23 1971 WAS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR UNDER THE
'
'
DOCTRINE
OF MIRANDA V. ARIZONA.

There is no case subsequent to Miranda, infra, interpreting the required warning to the satisfaction of every
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court, and every set of circumstances. The courts universally hold that each case must be determined upon
its own facts. For this purpose, respondent will lay before
this Court the facts relevant to the investigation carried
on in the home of Loren Craig Sims on the morning of
March 23, 1971.
Four police officers under the order of Captain Hayward were sent to the home of Loren Craig Sims as part
of a routine investigation aimed at piecing together information from those known to have last been in contact
with Linda Huntsman prior to her death (T. 322 and
4343).
On their way to the home, the officers were made
aware by Detective Forbes that Mr. Sims had been
charged with rape just prior to that time (T. 344). The
officers arrived at the home at approximately 9: 30 a.m.
(T. 321), and after identifying themselves were invited
into the Sims living room by Mrs. Sims (T. 322). She
awakened Craig and he appeared in the living room
shortly, clothed in a pair of levis and no shirt (T. 322).
Following some introductory comments, Detective
Forbes read verbatim the Miranda warning from a card
given him by Detective Bernardo.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,
10 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court laid out the
requisite material to be covered in a warning:
"Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be
as evidence against him, and that he has a nght to the
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presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." 384 U.S. 444.
The card used by Detective Forbes incorporated all
of the requisite statements lawfully required (T. 323).
Appellant was then asked if he understood his right
and Craig said "yes." (T. 331). He was then asked if he
would mind talking to them and he said, "No, go right
ahead." (T. 336), following which more questions were
placed before him. After approximately five minutes,
Craig said he would like to call his attorney and was invited to do so by the officers (T. 336). He was unable
to contact his attorney and returned to his discussion
with the police officers (T. 339 and 341). He then went
to his bedroom and got dressed as discussed in Point I
of this brief. This was done pursuant to a request made
by the officers that Craig take them down to his shop
(T. 347).
While in the bedroom, Detective Bernardo asked
Craig whether or not the levis, shorts, and plaid shirt
he was then wearing were the same clothes he was
wearing the night before, to which he replied, "Yes."
(T. 481, 492, 508).
It is this statment by Sims which the defense feels
was incorrectly allowed into testimony because it lent
some question to his credibility. There was other testimony indicating that Craig had not been wearing the
plaid shirt but had been seen in a black turtleneck
sweater, seen that morning in Sims' bedroom with long
strands of hair on it. The five of them then left the home;
the four officers in their car, and appellant, by himself,
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m his truck and joined together again at the shop
(T. 340).
A. THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN POLICE OFFICERS AND
APPELLANT AT HIS HOME ON THE MORNING OF
MARCH 23, 1971, WAS NOT A "CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION" REQUIRING OBSERVATION OF THE MIRANDA RIGHTS.

Respondent contends that appellant was not a suspect
of the officers at that time (T. 343), was not under
arrest and was not even in their custody during the period
of time they visited with him in his home.
There was never any evidence presented that even
appeared to be force used during that morning in the
home. No weapons were drawn, no threats were made,
no accusations placed and the entire atmosphere was one
of a routine investigation of a very serious crime. Sims
was not placed under arrest at that time, and there was
no indication that Sims was confined to the presence of
the officers, and during the entire oral investigation,
appellant's mother was nearby in the home (T. 340).
Even on driving down to the shop, care was taken to not
restrict Sims, as he was allowed to drive his own vehicle
alone, merely leading the way for the officers who desired
to carry their investigation to the shop. Even at the shop,
appellant was not alone but was in the presence of his
father (T. 340). A concern over flight or a weapon is
a routine police caution, but does not indicate custodial
status.
The Fifth Circuit faced a similar set of circumstances
in the case of United States v. Littlepage, 435 F.2d 498
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. den., 402 U.S. 915, 28 L.Ed.2d
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657, 91 S.Ct. 1374, reh. den. 402 U.S. 1013, 29 L.Ed.2d
436, 91 S.Ct. 2178.
There two officers visited a man's apartment between
the hours of 9: 00 or 9: 30 am. and aroused him from his
sleep. After introductory comments, he too was given his
Miranda rights and then questioned around the dining
room table for one solid hour. Concerning this, the Court
said:
"It seems quite clear that the questioning in
the instant case was not accomplished while the
defendant was 'in custody . . . or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.'" U 35 F.2d at 499.
The decision in Miranda v. Arizona clearly distinguishes between custodial and routine field investigation:
"Our decision is not intended to hamper the
traditional function of police officers in investigating crime.

*

*

*

"General on-the-scene questioning as to facts
surrounding a crime or other general questioning
of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by out holding. It is an act of responsible
citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement.
In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation
is not necessarily present." Id. at 477-78.
No inference can be drawn from the fact that Miranda rights were given, that they were necessary. Such
an inference was sought by the appellant in the case of
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United States v. Akin, 435 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1970)
and the court's reply is worthy of note:
"We cannot accept appellant's suggestion. To
rule that an FBI agent's extra-cautious efforts to
inform a person of his constitutional rights converts an otherwise non-custodial situation into
'custodial interrogation' could easily work to defeat one of the Supreme Court's main objectives
in Miranda, the objective of encouraging law enforcement agencies to develop ways of protecting
individual rights that are in harmony with effective law enforcement. We conclude, therefore, that
a custodial situation cannot be created by the mere
giving of modified Miranda warnings."
Clearly the rights were given, not to indicate custody
or arrest, but as a basic precautionary measure imposed
by the precedent concern for the rights of the individual.
On the morning of March 23, 1971, appellant was
not in custody and therefore any statements made by
him, even in the complete absence of a waiver of his
rights under Miranda, would be admissible in court
against him.
B. EVEN IF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE INVESTIGATION COULD BE CONSTRUED TO BE "CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION," APPELLANT KNOWINGLY AND
INTELLIGENTLY WAIVED HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE
DOCTRINE OF MIRANDA V. ARIZONA.

The facts are clear that the Miranda rights were
given the appellant completely and accurately. Waiver
was deemed effective from the time Sims responded to
the inquiry of his willingness to talk by the statement:
"No, go right ahead." (T. 336). In the minds of the
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officers there seemed to be no need to insult appellant's
intelligence by rephrasing the warning and repeating
their questions. The officers knew that Sims was aware
of the procedure surrounding investigation and waiver
of rights. They knew he was recently charged with the
crime of rape and would have had significant exposure
to that sort of thing (T. 344). They had no reason to
suspect, and no contention has been claimed even before
this Court, that he was not fully aware of what he was
doing.
In the case of United States v. Glasgow, 451 F.2d
557 (9th Cir. 1971) this type of knowledge on the part
of investigating officers was deemed very significant in
understanding whether appelant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. There the court said:
"At the time of his interrogation, Glasgow
already had an extensive prior criminal, record,
including a post-Miranda felony conviction. Obviously, he was familiar with police practices.
Furthermore, he underwent no apparent difficulty
either in understanding questions asked of him or
in making understandable responses during both
the interrogation and the trial. These facts justify
the District Court's conclusion that Glasgow's
waiver was knowing and intelligent." Id. at 558.
Appellant contends that because he could not get in
touch with his attorney, he had waived his waiver and
could not be held accountable for anything said thereafter. This is a flimsy argument that could have far
reaching consequences should it be allowed. Looking
retrospectively at any statements made by defendants
after an unsuccessful call to an attorney, viable testimony
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and evidence could be easily stricken in spite of voluntary waivers of Miranda rights.
This argument was raised before the Eighth Circuit
just last year in the case of United States v. Scogis, 459
F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1972) wherein the court said:
"The mere fact that she was unsuccessful in
reaching an attorney does not prohibit interrogation where it is clear that she knowingly intelligently, and voluntarily elected to proceed without
one." Id. at 187.
Such are the facts here. This being so, anything said
by appellant at that time was admissible as evidence
through the testimony of sheriff's deputies involved m
those early stages of the investigation.
POINT III
REVERSIBLE ERROR WAS NOT COMMITTED BY
THE TRIAL COURT IN PERMITTING F.B.I. AGENTS TO
TESTIFY CONCERNING FIBER SAMPLES, BLOOD SPOTS,
AND SEVEN SPOTS FOUND UPON THE CLOTHING OF
APPELLANT SEIZED FROM HIM BY SHERIFF'S DEPUTIES
AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST AND BOOKING IN THE
SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL.

All are agreed that the police have a legal right to
remove clothing from one under arrest prior to incarceration. All are agreed that the police have a right to
search that clothing. Utah Code Ann. §77-54-20 ( 1953)
reads:
"When a person charged with a felony is supposed to have on his person a
weapon,
or anything which may be used as.
of the
commission of the offense, the officer makmg the
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arrest shall cause him to be searched, and the
weapon or other thing must be retained, subject
to the order of the court in which the defendant
may be tried." (Emphasis added.)
Appellant would have us draw a line somewhere between the cursory examination of the clothing at the
moment of disrobing and the subsequent closer examination in a laboratory of that same clothing a few days
later, beyond which a search warrant must be issued.
Respondent contends that the search which began
legally incident to lawful arrest never ceased until the
evidence was thoroughly examined. Once an item is properly seized as evidence, its evidentiary uses are not limited
to the moment of seizure. The item may then be examined or used by the police as proper investigation dictates.
The purpose of a search warrant in Utah is spelled
out fully in Utah Code Ann. §77-54-1 ( 1953) which
reads:
"A search warrant is an order in writing, in
the name of the State, signed by a magistrate and
directed to a peace officer, commanding him to
search for personal property and bring it before
the magistrate." (Emphasis added.)
Here, the personal property was already legally in
the hands of the police. A warrant to search "for" personal property was not necessary to search that property
already legally acquired.
Appellant's argument on this point is noticeably void
of case law to support his specific point. Respondent does
not suffer from that same affliction.
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An examination of a portion of that supporting case
law should suffice to satisfy the vacuum of any borderline logic.
The Sixth Circuit in Clarke v. Neil, 427 F.2d 1322
(6th Cir. 1970) examined a similar complaint. There the
Court stated rather abruptly on page 1325:
"This argument is rejected. We do not consider
the laboratory examination of a suit after its seizure by the police to constitute a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment ...."
Not being considered a search under the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, no warrant is necessary.
Similar circumstances were presented before the District of Columbia Circuit Court in the case of Robinson
v. United States, 283 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1960) at 509
wherein the Court stated:
"Appellants ... complain that their clothing
was removed at police headquarters, shortly after
their arrest, and was subjected to tests at the
laboratories of the Federal Bureau of Investigation."
Then, after explaining the results of the tests on the
clothing, the court continued:
"We think that this procedure was proper,
since probable cause to believe appellants guilty
of housebreaking and larceny had already appeared, and appellants were validly under arrest
therefore."
Another Federal Court has dealt with this problem
several times. In the case of Goliher v. United States,
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362 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1966) the Court made this statement:
"Although the constitutional issue was not
raised, we recently approved the seizure of the
arrested persons' clothing and the admission of
scientific comparison evidence found thereon.
McNeeley v. United States, 353 F.2d 913 (1965).
Even when presented with the consitutional issue,
all the cases of which we are aware have specifically upheld, on various grounds, the validity of
seizing the clothing worn by the arrested individual and subjecting the same to scientific tests
later admitted into evidence."
Finally, two state court cases are worthy of note. In
Commonwealth v. Aljoe, 420 Pa. 198, 216 A.2d 50 (Penn.
1966), the court held that appellant was not subjected
to unreasonable search and seizure when tests were made
upon his clothing, which was removed after his arrest,
which revealed that stains on his trousers contained
traces of brain tissue.
The Supreme Court of Georgia in Elinburg v. State,
179 S.E. 2d 926 (Ga. 1971 ) ruled that clothing taken
from appellant at the time of arrest did not amount to
illegal search and did not render the evidence obtained
therefrom inadmissible in a prosecution for rape.
Therefore, here, either this was a continuation of a
legally initiated search, or not a search at all, and there·
fore no search warrant was required and evidence ob·
tained from the clothing was admissible in court.
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POINT IV
THE HANDLING OF SIMS' CLOTHING BY SHERIFF'S
DEPUTIES DID NOT RENDER THE EVIDENCE FOUND
THEREON INADMISSIBLE.

The admissibility of evidence has been held by courts
consistently to be subject to the discretion of the trial
judge. The Tenth Circuit has spoken several times on
this specific point. Recently in Reed v. United States, 377
F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1967), at page 893 they said:
"The law applicable to admissibility of physical exhibits is clearly stated in Brewer v. United
States, 8 Cir., 353 F.2d 260, to the effect that if,
upon consideration of the nature of the article,
the circumstances surrounding the preservation
and custody of it and the likelihood of intermeddlers tampering with it, the trial judge deems the
article to be in substantially the same condition as
when the crime was committed, he may admit it
into evidence, and his determination "that the
showing as to identification and nature * * * is
sufficient to warrant reception of an article in
evidence may not be overturned except for a clear
abuse of discretion."
Benjamin Forbes, Deputy Sheriff of Salt Lake County, was charged with handling Sims' clothing following
Sims' arrest. His testimony indicates the procedure followed:
MR. FORBES: A. These were the Jockey Shorts
I took off Craig Sims in the County Jail on the
23rd of March.
MR. BANKS: Q. What did you do after you removed them?
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A. They were put in a plastic bag and sealed.

Q. Were they sealed in the same manner as any
of the prior exhibits?
A. Yes, Sir. The same manner - sealed with a
seal of sealing across the top and stapled.

Q. What, if anything, did you do with them after
that?
A. I sent them back to the F.B.I. in Washington.

Q. At the time you sent them to the F.B.I. in

Washington, were they in the same condition as
they were at the time that you removed them from
Craig and placed them in the plastic bag?
A. Yes. They were.

The items were received at the FBI laboratories by
Robert E. Neill who testified as to their condition at that
time.
"MR. BARBER:
And I'll ask you whether or not any of these
items - well, do you recall how they were packed
- the individual items?
MR. NEILL:
I don't recall. I don't have an independent
recollection of the exact nature of the packaging.
I do recall that it was checked at the time to see
if it was packaged securely."
Based upon this, and subsequent testimony, the trial
judge had sufficient basis upon which to make his de·
termination that the evidence should be received. Cer·
tainly it cannot be said that the trial judge abused his
discretion.
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A defendant in circumstances such as these is doubly
protected in that he has the opportunity to create doubts
in the minds of the jurors concerning the chain of custody
which will reduce the weight they would tend to grant
to such evidence. The transcript shows clearly that the
defense took advantage of every opportunity to do so.
This is a question of weight and not admissibility.
The Third Circuit in United States v. Clark, 425 F.2d
827 ( 3d Cir. 1970) at 833 made this comment in a like
situation:
" ... the objections which the defendant here
makes go to the weight of the evidence rather than
to its admissibility and, hence, the question was
properly left to the jury."
The ruling in Gallego v. United States, 276 F.2d 914
(9th Cir. 1960) at 917 gave support to that stand when
they said:
"The jury, of course, is free to disregard such
evidence upon its finding that the article was not
properly identified, or that there has been a
change in its nature."
This Court sums it up as graphically as any in the
decision of State v. Madsen, 28 Utah 2d 108, 498 P.2d
670 ( 1972):
"While it is the duty of the court to make the
first determination, the jury may disregard the
evidence should they determine the custody of
the article or substance has not been sufficiently
shown or that it has been altered or changed. The
ruling of the trial court in this regard will not be
overturned unless there is a showing of an abuse
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of discretion. The record in this case does not
reveal an abuse of discretion."
Such are the circumstances here. The trial judge heard
arguments from both sides and exercised his discretion
to admit the evidence. Full opportunity was then granted
and usurped by the defense to reduce the weight given
that evidence before the jury.
In a case as intricate as this containing a network
of a myriad of circumstantial pieces of evidence aimed
at the guilt of the defendant, we have no way of knowing the weight the jury gave this particular piece. However much it was, they were all in agreement ultimately,
and that decision must stand.
POINT V
APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO THE COURT'S FEL·
ONY MURDER INSTRUCTION IS UNTIMELY, AND THE
ASSERTION THAT THE FELONY MURDER RULE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IS WITHOUT MERIT.

To enable the Court to follow appellant's reference
to jury instructions, it should be noted that appellant
mistakenly refers to and quotes the jury instructions given
in August, 1971, during the first trial of appellant instead
of the instructions given in November, 1971, during the
second trial which is the guilty verdict being appealed
here.
The first question is whether appellant can contest
the jury instruction on felony murder (Instruction No.
19 mistakenly referred to as Instruction No. 18 but
'
.
,
quoted substantially correctly at ?0-51 m ap_Pellant.s
brief) without taking timely except10n at the tnal. This
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court stated in State v. Zimmerman, 78 Utah 126, 1
P.2d 962 ( 1931):
"It is well established in this jurisdiction that
an exception to an instruction must be made before verdict, otherwise it may not be reviewed on
appeal." 1 P.2d at 964.
See also the discussion under Point VII, infra. Appellant's
Argument V should be stricken for lack of a timely exception.
Also, appellant's Argument V should be denied on
appeal because it is without legal merit. The Utah felony
murder rule is set out in Utah Code Ann. §76-30-3

(1953):

"Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in
wait or any other kind of wilful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated killing; or committed in
the p·erpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any
arson, rape, burglary or robbery; or perpetrated
from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being
other than the one who is killed; or perpetrated
by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others
and evidencing a depraved mind, regardless of
human life: - is murder in the first degree. Any
other homicide committed under such circumstances as would have constituted murder at common law in the second degree." (Emphasis added.)

It is evident when one considers the phrase "any other
homicide" and the fact that no other "homicide" is indicated above, that the legislature meant "every homicide" and not "every murder" in the first line of the
statute and fully intended that the commission, or at-

26
tempted commission, of specific felonies satisfy the need
to find "malice" for a murder conviction as required by
Utah Code Ann. §76-30-1 ( 1953). Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.
This argument is substantiated further by the legislature's
inclusion in every subdivision of Section 76-30-3 which
describes murder in the first degree, except the subdivision listing specific felonies, of some statement on malice
- "malicious and premeditated," "unlawfully and maliciously," and finally, "evidencing a depraved mind, regardless of human life." If the legislators had intended a
specific finding of malice, they would have enacted Section 76-30-3 with the language "or maliciously committed
in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson,
rape, burglary or robbery."
Appellant contends that a separate finding of malice
is necessary to sustain a constitutionality of a conviction
under the Utah felony murder rule, but cites no felony
murder cases to guide this Court other than State v.
Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135, 134 P. 632 ( 1913). Appellant
attempts to discredit the M ewhinney decision as this
Court in that decision upheld the felony murder rule.
Justice McCarty stated in his concurring opinion in that
case:
"I am unable to conceive a state of facts or
circumstances and certainly none has been suggested, under' which a murder committed in the
perpetration of
to i:erpetrate any of
the felonies mentioned m section 4161 [arson,
rape, burglary or robbery), would or could be
less than murder in the first degree. As I have
stated, the elements of first degree murder, name-
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ly, premeditation and deliberation that distinfrom ;econd degree
guishes first degree
murder, are not essential, when the crime is committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any one or more of the felonies referred to
to make the crime murder in the first degree." '
At 159, Justice McCarty quotes the California Supreme
Court from People v. Milton, 145 Cal. 169, 78 P. 549
( 1904), saying:
"The murder, under section 187 of the Penal
Code, is established, in that the killing is unlawful, it having been perpetrated in the performance
or attempt to perform one of these felonies [arson,
rape, robbery, burglary, or mayhem], and the
malice of the abandoned and malignant heart is
shown from the very nature of the crime you are
attempting to commit."
This Court devoted a large portion of the opinion in
State v. Russell, 106 Utah 116, 145 P.2d 1003 (1944) to
explaining the malice and intent necessary for a conviction of murder and, in particular of murder in the first
degree. The Court stated at 126:
"In order to have the necessary malice to commit murder (not necessarily murder in the first
degree), the killing must be unlawful, it must
result from or be caused by an act or omission
to act committed with one of the following intentions: ( 1 ) an intention or design previously formed
to kill or cause great bodily injury; or (2) an intention or design previously formed to do an act
or omit to do an act, knowing that the reasonable
and natural consequences thereof would be likely
to cause death or great bodily injury; or (3) a
previously thought out intentional or designed per-
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petration or attempt to perpetrate one of certain
kinds of felonies. This is not limited to arson rape
burglary and robbery mentioned in § 103-28-3'.
U.C.A. 1943 (sic), but it does not include all
felonies." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the two elements required to indicate the necessary malice for the killing to be "murder" in the ·present
case are ( 1) that "the killing ... be unlawful," and (2)
that the act of killing result from the intentional perpetration of "one of certain kinds of felonies," that is,
rape.
The Court goes on to indicate how the legislature set
the boundaries between first degree murder and second
degree murder and quotes the statutes which was applicable then, Utah Code Ann. § 103-28-3 ( 2) ( 1943), now
Utah Code Ann. §76-30-3 ( 1953). "Every murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate,
any arson, rape, burglary or robbery is murder in the
first degree." The Court interpreted the statute by saying:
"The term 'every murder' is used in describing
each division of murder in the first degree. Thus,
murder in the first degree requires an unlawful
killing of a human being with malice aforethought,
but not all such kilings are murder in the first
degree. Only such killing which has the elements
required by at least one of these four divisions is
murder in the first degree. . . . Divisions 2 and 4
do not require an intention or design to kill. Div!sion 2 requires an intention or design to
'arson, rape, burglary or robbery .... " (Emphasis
added.)
This court indicated in State v. Thorne, 39 Utah 208,
117 P. 58 (1911) that the "willful and premeditated
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intent to commit the felony is transferred from that
offense to the homicide actually committed." 39 Utah at
217. The jury only needed to find that the appellant
killed the victim during the course of the commission of
the crime of rape. The intent to rape, according to Justice McCarty and the Court in Russell, supra, is transferred to the killing itself to support a charge of murder
in the first degree.
Malice in murder may be either express or implied.
76-30-2 U.C.A. 1953. It is implied when the circumstances of the killing occur such as would evidence fl
depraved heart such as when the individual is engaged
in the commission of a serious felony such as rape. In
People v. Sears, 2 Cal. 3d 180, 465 P.2d 487 ( 1970), the
California court observed:
The felony-murder rule operates ( 1) to posit
the existence of malice aforethought in homicides
which are the direct causal result of the perpetration or attempted perpetration of all felonies inherently dangerous to human life, and ( 2) to posit
the existence of malice aforethought and to classify the offense as murder of the first degree in
homicides which are the direct causal result of
those six felonies specifically enumerated in section 189 of the Penal Code. [Citations.] ( 70 Cal.
2d at p. 538.)
It would appear therefore that no actual finding of
malice is necessary nor need of instruction to such extent
be given to the jury. Malice has evolved into a term of
art with reference to the law of homicide. It does not
approximate its literal meaning. Lefevre & Scott, Criminal Law at 528, 1972. The only finding necessary is that
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the defendant's conduct be the proximate or legal cause
of the victim's death. LeFevre & Scott, supra, at 546.
Appellant quotes Mr. Justice Harlan from Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 273, 31 L.Ed 205 (1887),
as stating:
It belongs to the legislative branch of government to exert what are known as the police powers
of the state, and to determine primarily what
measures are appropriate or needful for the protection of the public morals, the public health, the
public safety." (Appellant's brief at 55.)
Respondent strongly endorses that view and submits
that the Utah legislature, in enacting Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-30-3 ( 1953), was fulfilling that charge. Utah Code
Ann. §76-30-2 ( 1953) indicates that "malice may be
express or implied. . . . It is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances
attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant
heart." The legislature evidenced, by selecting the specific provisions of "arson, rape, burglary or robbery" for
codification in Utah Code Ann. §76-30-3 (1953), the
conclusion that, in the words of the California Supreme
Court, "the malice of the abandoned and malignant
heart is shown from the very nature of the crime." The
Utah legislature also finds support from the Model Penal
Code, which although suggesting that felony murder be
limited to acts "committed recklessly under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life," suggests that the accused be required to rebut the
presumption that sufficient indifference and recklessness
existed if he were "engaged, or is an accomplice in the
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commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or
deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force,
arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape." Proposed Official Draft §210. 2 ( 1962) .
Appellant contends that the Utah legislature cannot
impute malice without denying a defendant the due
process guaranteed by the United States Constitution,
but cites no cases on point. Respondent contends that the
Utah legislature was exerting the police powers in determining "what measures are appropriate or needful for
the protection of the public morals, the public health,
the public safety," as outlined above by Mr. Justice Harlan. Since the legislature has more resources for making
studies to determine what is best for the general good
of the community, such questions are better determined
by the legislature than the courts.
Even if this Court were to determine that the legislature did not intend to remove the malice required to
be found in the specific enumerated cases, this Court has
recently ruled favorably to respondent's position in State
v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 ( 1970), on a
very similar factual situation. After making the assumption that the enumerated felonies - arson, rape, burglary or robbery - are inherently dangerous, this Court
stated:
In listing certain felonies which are dangerous
to the lives of others, it certainly was not intended
to exclude other felonies which might be so, and
this must be determined from the circumstances
of the particular crime.
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"It is so obvious as not to require elucidation
that the act of sodomy committed in the manner
shown here, with the deceased so bound that he
to death, was an act 'greatly dangerous to
hves of others and evidencing a depraved
mmd, regardless of human life.' The trial court
did not submit a first-degree murder verdict. But
circumstances shown, the giving of the
mstruction on felony murder in the second degree
and the verdict of guilty rendered thereon, were
amply justified.'' 24 Utah 2d at 261.

If rape itself is not an inherently dangerous felony as
this Court assumed it to be, then the way in which this
particular rape of Linda Huntsman was committed was
not only "greatly dangerous" to her life, but also evidenced "a depraved mind, regardless of human life,"
sufficiently to place this homicide under that first degree
murder portion of Section 76-30-3 ( 1953) and to malice
under Section 76-30-2 ( 1953). She was subdued with a
cord around her neck which eventually strangled her,
much as the victim in the Sc had case was strangled.
Appellant's objection to the jury instruction on felony
murder is untimely. The Utah legislature did not intend
to require a separate showing of malice with the specific
felonies listed in Utah Code Ann. §76-30-3 ( 1953). If
the Court finds the Utah legislature did intend a showing of malice with those specific felonies, the circumstances surrounding this particular rape clearly indicate
an abandoned and malignant heart sufficient to imply
malice aforethought. This is particularly true in light of
this Court's ruling in State v. Schad, supra, in which the
Court found the use of a ligiture during an act of sodomy
to clearly evidence an abandoned and malignant heart.
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For these reasons, Appellant's Argument V must be rejected by this Court.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE.

It is a well settled proposition in Utah case law that
a change of venue is within the trial court's judicial discretion and subjected to review only for abuse of such
discretion. In appellate review of the exercise of this
discretion, the appellant must satisfy the Supreme Court
that the trial court exercised its discretion clearly against
reason and evidence. State v. Smith, 11 Utah 2d 287, 358
P.2d 342 ( 1961) ; State v. BeBee, 110 Utah 484, 175
P.2d 478 ( 1948); State v. Carrow, 64 Utah 87, 228 P.
563 ( 1924) ; State v. Green, 86 Utah 192, 40 P.2d 961
( 1935). Respondent submits that appellant has failed to
show that the trial court exercised such abuse.

It is recognized that there was publicity commensurate with the magnitude of the crime. This cannot, nor
should not be eliminated. A mere showing of publicity
on its own, however, is not sufficient grounds for granting
a change of venue. The likelihood of prejudice must be
shown to be so persuasive that it would influence the
jury and prevent a fair trial.
The case of Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86
S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966), cited as support for
appellant's position, involved prejudicial news coverage
carried to the extreme.
"Much of the material printed or broadcast
during the trial was never heard from the witness
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as the charges that Sheppard had purstand,
posely impeded the murder investigation and must
be guilty since he had hired a prominent criminal lawyer; that Sheppard was a perjurer; that
he had sexual relations with numerous women·
that his slain wife had characterized him as
'Jekyll-Hyde'; that he was a 'a bare-faced liar' because of his testimony as to police treatment· and
finally, that a woman convict claimed Sheppard
to be the father of her illegitimate child." Id. at
356-7.
Such glaring prejudice is found nowhere in the news coverage of the Craig Sims trial.
The court in Estes v. United States, 335 F.2d 609 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. den. 379 U.S. 964, 13 L.Ed.2d 559, 85
S.Ct. 656, rehearing den. 380 U.S. 926, 13 L.Ed.2d 814,
85 S.Ct. 884, took some reasoning from the Supreme
Court decision in Beck v Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 82
S.Ct. 955, 8 L.Ed.2d 98 ( 1962) when they said:
"There was no specific showing of bias and
prejudice by appellant resulting from the widespread publicity, and the fact alone of such publicity did not in itself constitute a sufficient showing of bias and prejudice."
Appellant cites Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct.
1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 ( 1961) to support his contention.
A close reading of that case will show that the appellant
there had become a notorious celebrity in a relatively
small county - not like appellant in our case. In building
up to their decision in the case the court discussed their
feelings regarding normal publicity for a criminal prosecution. In 366 U.S. at pages 722 and 723 they said:
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"It is _not required, however, that the jurors
be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved.
In these days of swift, widespread and diverse
methods of communication, an important case can
be expected to arouse the interest of the public in
the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some
impression or opinion as to the merits of the case.
This is particularly true in criminal cases. To
hold that the mere existence of any preconceived
notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused,
without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be
to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient
if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion
and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S.\ 131, 31
L.Ed. 80, 8 S.Ct. 21, 22; Holt v. United States,
218 U.S. 245, 54 L.Ed 1021, 31 S.Ct. 2, 20 Ann.
Cas. 1138; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
155, 25 L.Ed. 244, 246."
The Court is clear in stating that if a juror is aware
of the facts and even has an opinion regarding them, so
long as he can lay aside that opinion and render a verdict
on the facts, there has been no reversible error committed. In Sinclair v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 126, 434 P.2d 305
(1967) affirmed, 447 F.2d 1158 (10th Cir. 1971), cert.
den. 391 U.S. 924 (1968), this Court held that the fact
that jurors may have become aware of purported facts
of a case through publicity does not disqualify them if
they can swear to impartiality. See also Sinclair v. Turner,
447 F.2d 1158 (10th Cir. 1971) cert. den. 391 U.S. 924,
88 S.Ct. 1822, 20 L.Ed.2d 663 ( 1968).
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A close reading of the transcript will show that out
of the twelve jurors and one alternate selected for the
jury, only four of them had heard anything regarding this
case or the defendant Loren Craig Sims. Those jurors
were Joseph John Jacob (T. 229); Irene Jones (T. 7476); Barbara Christensen (T. 79-80); and Rulon D. Billingsley (T. 217). The prospective jurors were so honest
in their responses that one of them admitted having read
the name of the appellant on a bulletin board in the hall
of the Metropolitan Hall of Justice the day he appeared
for jury duty (T. 219).
When Mr. Jacob was asked whether he could set
aside anything he had heard and rely on the evidence he
said he "definitely would be able to set that aside" (T.
230). When Irene Jones was asked a similar question,
her reply was "I think I could, uh-hum" (T. 74). When
Barbara Christensen was asked if she had any doubt that
she could not set aside what she had read, she said "No"
(T. 80). Mr. Billingsley's reply to the question of whether
he could set aside what he had heard was "I think so."
(T.219).
The judge was careful when he got the jury seated
to admonish them very specifically to remain aloof from
all outside influences of publicity (T. 235) and carried
on that practice, as he is required to, each time the jury
left the courtroom.
Appellant has failed to show any way in which the
jurors were or could have been prejudiced to the point
of not being able to disregard the things that they had
confronted in the past. Once again, the judge exercised
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his discretion wisely and committed no reversible error
in refusing to grant a change of venue.
POINT VII
THE REFUSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT TO PERMIT
JAMES T. WESTON TO TESTIFY AS TO THE PROBABLE
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE VICTIM'S
DEATH WAS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR.

With this point, appellant is attempting to raise on
appeal an issue which has not been properly preserved
for this court's ruling. It is well established among the
courts of the United States that in order to preserve for
review an objection to the exclusion of evidence, a proper
offer of proof must be made at the time such evidence is
sought to be admitted (See 4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error
§291(b) at 895; and Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error
§604). No such proffer was made here.
Utah courts are bound by statute to follow this procedure. Utah Code Ann. §77-44-2 (1953) states:
"The rules of evidence in civil actions shall be
applicable also to criminal actions, except as otherwise provided in this code."
No mention is made of offers of proof in the statutory
rules of criminal procedure in Utah, but through Utah
Code Ann. §77-44-2, supra, the rules of Civil Procedure
apply. In Rule 43 ( c), Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah
Code Ann. Vol. 9, Trials, we read:
" ( c) Record of Excluded Evidence. Ir:i an action by a jury, if an objection. to a question propounded to a witness is sustamed by
court,
the examining attorney may make a specific offer
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of what he expects to prove by the answer of the
witness. The court may require the offer to be
made out of the hearing of the jury. The cpurt
may add such other or further statement as clearly
shows the character of the evidence, the form in
which it was offered, the objection made, and
the ruling thereon."
Failure to follow this procedure precludes review. The
trial court did not have the facts necessary to establish
the admissibility of the testimony and therefore cannot
be reversed on the decision it made.
Admissibility of the opinions of experts is a decision
resting solely upon the discretion of the trial court. Rule
56 of the Rules of Evidence as adopted by the Supreme
Court of Utah, effective July 1, 1971, states it clearly:
Testimony in Form of Opinion

*

*

*

" ( 2) If the witness is testifying as an expert,
testimony of the witness in the form of opinions
or inferences is limited to such opinions as the
Judge finds are (a) based on facts or data perceived by or personally known or made known to
the witness at the hearing and (b) within the
scope of the special knowledge, skill, experience
or training possessed by the witness."
The trial court exercised its discretion by ruling
against the admissibility of the evidence considering "it
to be too speculative" (T. 829).
Not only did it promise to be too speculative, but
it was the type of analysis which the jury could have,
and obviously did, perform on their own. In retrospect,
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the appellant does not claim that any new facts would
have been set before the jury, but merely that the witness
would summarize his testimony covering some 33 pages
of transcript. This is not the job of an expert witness.

M acshara v. Garfield, 20 Utah 2d 152, 434 P.2d 756
( 196 7) discussed this very problem:
In directing our attention to the rulings on
evidence we note first that the trial judge, as the
authority in control of the proceeding, has some
latitude of discretion in passing upon which evidence has sufficient credibility and probative value
to be helpful in establishing the facts. We think
the trial court was correct in not allowing the
officer to in effect reconstruct the accident and
the speed and direction of the vehicles on the
basis of such physical evidence as: gouge marks
on the lawn and on the curbing, the damage to
the automobiles, and the course he assumed they
took after the impact. The disallowance of the
evidence was in conformity with the rule that such
an opinion is not admissible if a layman of ordinary intelligence can just as well interpret the
evidence as the experts. In this connection it
should be observed that all of the complete evidence, including photographs taken of the vehicles,
were before the jury. And further, that the trial
court did allow the officer to give his observations as to the damage to the vehicles and its causation, and to give his estimate of their speed
based upon the skid marks."

And also in Day v. Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc., 17
Utah 2d 221, 408 P.2d 186 (1965), this Court held in
speaking of a proposed expert's opinion:

40
"The opinion should not be admitted if it is
based upon the same evidence as is available to
the jury and a layman of ordinary intelligence
can equally determine what happened." Id. at 223.
In our case, the jury had been presented with all of
facts, detailed reports of physical examinations, photographs, and expert testimony as to probable causes. It
was not necessary to recapitulate all that had once before
been spoken from the witness stand, and failure to allow
it could in no way be construed as a reversible error.
Therefore, because no proffer of proof was made during the trial as required, and because the judge properly
exercised him discretion in allowing the jury to draw their
conclusions which they were perfectly capable of doing,
no error has been established to warrant a reversal of
the court below.
POINT VIII
OBJECTIONS TO INSTRUCTIONS WILL NOT BE
CONSIDERED ON APPEAL IN THE ABSENCE OF TIMELY
EXCEPTIONS, AND APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST
INSTRUCTIONS NO. 15 AND NO. 16 ARE WITHOUT
MERIT.

Defendant's attorney failed to take exception to any
jury instructions, and is therefore not permitted to quesion the jury instructions on appeal, absent a showing of
special circumstances.
THE COURT: The court will be in informal recess until the jury does return. Would you like to
take your exceptions at this time, gentlemen? If
you do, you can take them now.
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MR. BANKS: Comes now the State of Utah and
does not except to the Court's instructions.
MR:
May we have an objection to any
possible misstatements of the other witnesses during the course of the argument. This objection is
limited to quotations from transcripts of prior
hearing. There are no objections to the instructions. (T. 1200-1201) (The same conversation is
also reported at T. 433-434 after closing arguments.)
The Utah Legislature provided in the codes of criminal and civil procedure the means to preserve for appeal
objections to instructions. Utah Code Ann. §77-37-1
states: "Exceptions to instructions to the jury shall be
taken and preserved as in civil cases." Rule 51 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure indicates how exceptions
are to "be taken and preserved . . . in civil cases."
... No party may assign as error the giving
or failure to give an instruction unless he objects
thereto. In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement,
the appellate court, in its discretion and in the
interests of justice, may review the giving or failure to give an instruction.
This rule and statute have been held by the Utah
courts to foreclose to an appellant objections to jury instructions where appellants have not taken timely exception, unless special circumstances exist. State v. Anderson,
75 Utah 496, 286 P. 645 ( 1930), "The objection to the
instruction is groundless. Besides, there are no exceptions.
The appeal has no merit." State v. Zimmerman, 78 Utah
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126, 1P.2d962 at 964 (1931), "It is well established
in this jurisdiction that an exception to an instruction
must be made before verdict, otherwise it may not be
reviewed on appeal."
The reason for the rule was explained by this Court
in a civil case, Marks v. Tompkins, 7 Utah 421 at 425,
27 P. 6 at 7 ( 1891), where this Court stated:
Exceptions to the charge given, or the refusal
to charge as requested, should be specific enough
to show what parts of it are regarded as erroneous,
or how it injuriously affects the rights of the party
complaining; and these exceptions should be made
and pointed out before these verdict of the jury
is reached so that the judge may have an opportunity to correct any errors which he may have
inadvertently fallen into during the hurry and perplexities of the trial.
Special circumstances have in some cases been held
to waive the requirement for timely exception, but these
have been extreme circumstances. In State v. Cobo, 90
Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1936), where the trial court made
a fair trial impossible by misleading jury instructions, the
court indicated:
[W] e think that when palpable error is made t_o
appear on the face of the record and to the mamfest prejudice of the accused, the court has the
power to notice such error and to correct the
same, though no formal exception was taken to
the ruling. 60 P.2d at 958.
However, the standard indicated by the court in "ordinary" cases was "that in ordinary cases on appeal errors
relating to instructions or refusing requests to instruct

43

will not be considered or reviewed unless exceptions thereto were properly taken by the party complaining." 60
P.2d at 958.
In State v. Hines, 6 Utah 2d 126, 307 P.2d 887
( 195 7) , the special circumstances to which the court
looked in allowing review of instruction were the criminal
nature of the proceedings and the absence of defense
counsel.
In the present "ordinary" case, there are no similar
extreme circumstances which would call for appellate
review, and appellant makes no claim for special circumstances. Appellant was represented by counsel. There
is no "palpable error ... on the face of the record." Appellant's Argument VIII should be stricken for lack of
timely exception.
Looking to the substantive merit of appellant's arguments, appellant misstates the court's instruction on reasonable doubt, giving instead of the correct instruction,
the instruction from the first trial held in August. The
real instruction was numbered 15, not 14, and read thus:
"Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof that satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding of those who are bound
to act conscientiously upon it. A reasonable doubt
is not one that is merely possible, fanciful or imaginary, because most everything relating to human
affairs is open to some possible doubt. But a reasonable doubt is one which is real and substantial;
it is a doubt based upon reason and one which
reasonable men (and women) would have upon
a consideration of all of the evidence. It must
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arise from the evidence or the lack of evidence in
the case.

If, after an impartial consideration and comparison of all the
you can honestly say
that you are not satisfied of the defendant's guilt,
you have a reasonable doubt; but if after such
impartial consideration and comparison of all the
evidence, you can truthfully say that you have an
abiding conviction of the defendant's guilt such
as you would be willing to act upon in the more
weighty and important matters relating to your
own affairs, you have no reasonable
The instruction on circumstantial evidence, N o.16, was
as Appellant quotes his number 15 from the trial in
August.
Appellant argues that the so-called "personal business test," that reasonable doubt is "such a doubt as
would cause a reasonable, prudent and considerate person to pause and hesitate to take actions pertaining to
the more important affairs of his life applies only to
measurement of "reasonable doubt" and supplies a standard for the jury to measure only their "doubts" and not
their "abiding conviction of the defendant's guilt" as indicated in Instruction No. 15. This test for reasonable
doubt was approved in State v. Williamson, 22 Utah 248,
62 P. 1022 ( 1900) and Holt v. United States, 218 U.S.
245, 31 S.Ct. 2, 54 L.Ed. 1021 ( 1910).
Appellant further argues that " [ t] his is entirely different from using the personal business test as an affirmative definition of reasonable doubt as was done by the
trial court in this case." Appellant's Brief at 75. Appellant's argument is that the courts have held the personal
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business test is to be utilized in instructions only to help
the jury determine reasonable doubt, not to determine
moral certainty or conviction "beyond a \reasonable
doubt." This is, of course, a conceptual distinction without a difference on its face. What criteria are used to
measure the presence of doubt, by its absence will clearly
also define the presence of certainty.
Appellant seems to argue, although vaguely and
without explicating his contentions, that this application
of the "personal business" test is somehow "unfair" to
Appellant and amounts, in fact, to denial of his rights
to due process. Evidently, what is meant is that Appellant feels that use of the "personal business" test to affirmatively define lack of reasonable doubt, "abiding conviction of the defendant's guilt" as the trial court put it in
Instruction No. 15, shifted the presumption by linguistic
means from requiring the jury to find him not guilty if
they entertained any reasonable doubt, to requiring them
to find him guilty if they were unable to find such a
doubt in the case as would prevent them from acting in
their personal affairs. This Court has recently reaffirmed
in State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 370 P.2d 212 ( 1957),
at 114, that "reasonable doubt" must amount to more
than a "mere possibility."
" [I] t is not sufficient merely that reasonable
minds may have entertained such doubt. Before a
verdict may properly be set aside, it must appear
that the evidence was so inconclusive or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds acting fairly upon
it must have entertained reasonable doubt that
defendants committed the crime. Unless the evi-
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dence compels such conclusion as a matter of law
the verdict must stand."
'
Much earlier, the United States Supreme Court held
exactly such an instruction as No. 15 non-prejudicial in
Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 7 S.Ct. 614, 30 L.Ed 708
( 1887). In H opt the jury instruction was that the jury
had no reasonable doubt if, after consideration of the
evidence, they had an abiding conviction of guilt, such
as they would be willing to act upon in the more weighty
and important matters relating to their own affairs. The
Court stated at 618-619:
It is difficult to conceive what amount of conviction would leave the mind of a juror free from
reasonable doubt, if it be not one which is so settled and fixed as to control his action in the more
weighty and important matters relating to his own
affairs. Out of the domain of the exact sciences
and actual observation there is no absolute certainty.

*

*

*

Persons of speculative minds may in almost
every case suggest possibilities of the truth being
different from that established by the most convincing proof. The jury are not to be led away by
speculative notions as to such possibilities.
The Supreme Court held that this was particularly
non-prejudicial where the questioned instruction was
coupled with one which required the jurors not to convict if they could reconcile the evidence with any reasonably hypothesis consistent with the defendant's innocence.
Instruction No. 16 given in this case and quoted by Appellant as No. 15 is just such an instruction. Defendant
still claims that the H opt instructions as approved by the
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United States Supreme Court amount to "cruel and unusual punishment" of the jurors because they are so ambiguous and contradictory. Appellant's Brief at 78.
It is clear that the trial court's juxtaposition of Instructions No. 15 and No. 16 was an attempt to meet
the H opt constitutional standard as originally set forth
by this Court and later approved by the United States
Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court has
declared that this combination meets the constitutional
standard and has not reversed its decision. This Court
should follow that decision.
Appellant's argument at 75 of Appellant's Brief that
the 9th Circuit in Paddock v. United States, 79 F.2d 872
(9th Cir. 1935), disapproves the Hopt ruling is specious.
The quoted matter is not appropriate to the present case.
Paddock disapproved an instruction which set out the
personal business test but went too far in attempting to
define the general phrase "[personal] weighty and important matters" by giving specific illustrations and suggesting such a matter would be the purchase of real
estate. Appellant attempts an argument reductio ad
absurdum using this very illustration at 77 of his brief.
The illustration is borrowed from Paddock, supra, where
the 9th Circuit did indeed state at 876-877:

"No court, so far as our examination shows,
has attempted to state to a jury just what matters
are of sufficient importance to be used in comparison with the
in a .
case which deprives an md1vidual of his hfe or
liberty. Under the usual
by
some courts, each juror is left to determme for
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himself what he considers the "highly important"
or the "more weighty and important matters"
affecting his own life. To tell the jury in effect
that reasonable doubt has no more significance in
deciding a criminal case than the doubt by a juror
as to whether the price offered to him for a piece
of property is as much as he can expect to get for
it, is in our mind to entirely eliminate the doctrine
of reasonable doubt from the consideration of the
jury."
What Appellant's Brief fails to make clear is that the
court in Paddock upheld the business test as a proven
formulation, and one sanctioned by the United States
Supreme Court if not diluted by explanatory examples.
Respondents give below an extended quotation from
Paddock since Appellant's selective quotation at 75 of his
brief quotes the court out of context and alters their
reasoning.
"There is anoher objection to these instructions
on reasonable doubt which we think worthy of attention, and that is the business test as applied to
the decision of a criminal case. This test has been
wholly rejected by some courts and sustained by
others. For brevity, we refer to cases collated under Decennial Digests, Criminal Law, §789 ( 12),
in the American Digest system. Before discussing
the matter, we call attention to paragraph V of
the supplementary instructions in which the
informed the jury that they should be convinced
to that degree of certainty upon which 'you act in
your own important affairs.' If the .instruction
stopped here,it might have been sustamed under
some of the authorities, although directly contrary
to others. The federal courts are bound by the
decision of the Supreme Court upon that matter
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in Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 7 S.Ct. 614, 618,
30 L.Ed. 708, where the court approved an instruction upon the subject of reasonable doubt
which contained the following: 'But if * * * you
can truthfully say that you have an abiding conviction of the defendant's guilt, such as you would
be willing to act upon in the more weighty and
important matters relating to your own affairs,
you have no reasonable doubt.' While the instruction contained the phrase 'the more weighty and
important matters relating to your own affairs,'
it was no doubt approved because it was a part
of an instruction which had fully explained the
doctrine of reasonable doubt. We do not believe
that court will approve the business test when
segregated from the other elements which were
included in the instruction approved in H opt v.
Utah, supra. We followed Hopt v. Utah, supra, in
Shepard v. United States (C.C.A.) 236 F. 73, 80.
In those decisions which have sustained the business test, the comparison has been confined to the
"more weighty and important matters" or to the
matters of the highest importance. No court, so
far as our examination shows, has attempted to
state to a jury just what matters are of sufficient
importance to be used in comparison with the
decision of guilt in a criminal case which deprives
an individual of his life or liberty. Under the usual
instruction approved by some courts, each juror
is left to determine for himself what he considers
the "highly important" or the "more weighty and
important matters affecting his own life." To t.ell
a jury in effect reasonable doubt has no more significance in deciding a criminal case than the
doubt by a juror as to whether the price offered
to him for a piece of property is as much as he
can expect to get for it, is in our mind to entirely
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eliminate the doctrine of reasonable doubt from
the consideration of the jury.
We are inclined to agree with the statement
of Justice McFarland, speaking for the Supreme
Court of California in People v. Paulsell, 115 Cal.
6, 46 P. 734: 'If experimental departures from the
well-established language sanctioned by all courts
upon the subject of reasonable doubt are to be
here allowed, and each trial court is to venture
upon unusual language to express the idea contained in language so often approved, we will be
afloat upon a new and unknown sea, and complications will arise in every criminal case coming
here which will be very difficult to unravel." 79
F.2d at 876-877.
It is inapposite if not misleading to quote Paddock as
overruling Hopt. If anything Paddock reaffirmed Hopt's
vitality in 1935 in the federal courts and in those states
which adopt the business test. Utah is emphatically such
a state since the leading case in modem United States
jurisprudence, the H opt case, originated here.
Scurry v. United States, 347 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir.
1965), referred to by Appellant at 76 of his brief, is
from a jurisdiction which rejects the business test altogether. The law in Utah is to the contrary. As this Court
stated in State v. Sullivan, supra, at 114:
'' [W] here circumstances otherwise strongly
subsuggest guilt, the doubt sho.uld be real
stantial and not one that is merely possible or
imaginary. All that is required is that the jurors
have an abiding conviction of the defendant's
guilt such as they would be willing to act upon
in the more weighty and important matters relating to their own affairs."

51
Appellant argues lastly that Instructions No. 15 and
No. 16, taken together, set up an insoluble conflict for
jurors since the former pronounces a subjective standard,
"proof that satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding," whereas the latter is objective, requiring acquittal if evidence can be interpreted "on any reasonable
ground other than the guilt of the defendant." Taken as
a whole, Appellant claims these instructions preclude a
fair trial and violate rights to due process.
Appellant's comments about the difficulty of defining "reasonable doubt" and distinguishing between preponderance (civil) and beyond a reasonable doubt ( criminal) quanta of proof are well taken and representatively
reflected in the quoted portion of Paddock, supra. The
introduction of such terms as "satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding," perhaps better terms than
those objected to by Appellant at 77, cannot be reasonably supposed to throw an average venireman into an
insoluble quandary. Many jurors will be unable to distinguish between objective and subjective standards in
any case. Far from being a disadvantage, jury subjectivity has been hailed by highly respected commentators
as the genius of the jury system, an informal way of
ensuring expression of the conscience of the community.
See Kalven and Zeisel, The American Jury (1966), seriatim. Conceptually it is indistinguishable whether a court
calls on jurors for their convictions of guilty "beyond a
reasonable doubt" based on failure to accept any other
hypothesis as reasonably explaining the evidence ( Instruction No. 16) and asking the jurors to state their mind's
or understanding's "abiding conviction of the defendant's
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guilt," unallayed by any such hesitation as would prevent their acting in their own important affairs ( Instruction No. 15). Appellant's argument is without merit.
For the reasons stated above, Appellant's arguments
should be rejected and the jury verdict should be
affirmed.
POINT IX
THE JURY WAS FULLY CAPABLE OF RENDERING A
JUST DECISION COMPORTING WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS.

The Utah Supreme Court has said that the trial judge
has the final responsibility for conducting the trial and
he should be allowed "considerable latitude of discretion with respect to the mechanics of procedure; and
his rulings must be sustained unless he has acted in some
manner which is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and
to the prejudice of the objecting party." Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 11, 354 P.2d 564, 566 ( 1960).
The decision of the trial judge was not arbitrary and
unreasonable, and the appellant has failed to show how
he was prejudiced.
In Xenakis v. Garrett Freight Lines, 1 Utah 2d 299,
265 P.2d 1007 ( 1954), the Court said that it is within
the sound discretion of the trial court to determine at
what time the jury should deliberate.
The case of United States v. Parks, 411 F.2d 1171 (2d
Cir. 1969) , cited by appellant, is easily distinguished
from this case by the point upon which that decision
turned. In that case the jury had reported to the judge
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that it was tired and the judge made them continue deliberation. Such was not the case here. There was no
indication that they were tired, and no requests were
made to wait until the next day, and no objection was
raised by appellant to the continued deliberation.

In State v. Poe, 24 Utah 2d 355, 471P.2d870 ( 1970),
a similar set of circumstances was presented before this
Court. In that case the deliberation went later than in
this one. There the court said at 873:
"The record does not disclose that the jury at
any time during the period of their deliberations
indicated the desire for a postponement or made
any indication to the court that they were too
tired to proceed. Defendant makes no showing that
the lateness of the hour when the jury commenced
their deliberations tended in any way to affect his
rights to a fair trial, or that the verdict may have
been otherwise had the jury been sequestered."
The appellant cannot assume that the jury would
find him guilty just because they deliberated at a late
hour. More prejudicial effects could have resulted if the
trial judge had interrupted the jury's deliberation.
Clearly, the judge did not abuse his discretion in
allowing the jury to conduct their business as they did,
particularly when no objection was made at the time by
appellant or the jurors themselves.
POINT X
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, THE UTAH SUPREME
COURT AND NUMEROUS OTHER COURTS HAVE HELD
THE UNIT ARY VERDICT SYSTEM CONSTITUTIONAL,
AND SUCH APPROVAL HAS NOT BEEN RETRACTED.
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This Court, in State v. Kelbach, 23 Utah 2d 231,
461 P.2d 297 ( 1969), considered the arguments against
the unified verdict system which appellant now advances
and dismissed them as being without merit. The Court
said, with regard to the self-incrimination contention:
"There is nothing in the single-verdict procedure whereby the State coerces the defendant
to waive his privilege against self-incrimination.
He is compelled to testify only in the sense that
it may be to his advantage; this inducement to
forego his right to remain silent does not arise from
any unnecessary burden imposed by the State."
23 Utah 2d at 234.
On the "unconstitutionally vague" contention, the Court
replied by quoting with favor the following language from
Segura v. Patterson, 402 F.2d 249, 252 (C.A. 10th,
1968):
". . . This court has discovered not one successful attack upon the discretion allowed the jury in
this context. Perhaps this is because it is neither
desirable nor feasible to postulate a specific standard to so control the jury. It is axiomatic that
the line between contemporary community values
and the penal system is filed by the jury's being
allowed to be reflective of prevailing social
thought. To assert that the adoption of rigid guidelines seeking to control the jury in this respect,
thereby substituting merciless standards for
ent day flexibility, is compelled by due process is
clearly untenable." 23 Utah 2d at 235.
Two years before the Kelbach case the United States
Supreme Court, in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 87
S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed. 2d 606 ( 1967), ruled that the Con-
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stitution allows unitary verdict proceedings in capital
cases.

"!o

say that the two-stage jury trial in the
English-Connecticut style is probably the fairest,
as some commentators and courts have suggested,
and with which we might well agree were the
matter before us in a legislative or rule-making
context, is a far cry from a constitutional determination that this method of handling the problem
is compelled by the Fourteenth Amendment. Twopart jury trials are rare in our jurisprudence;
they have never been compelled by this Court as
a matter constitutional law, or even as a matter
of federal procedure. With recidivism the major
problem that it is, substantial changes in trial
procedure in countless local courts around the
country would be required were this Court to sustain the contentions made by these petitioners.
This we are unwilling to do. To take such a step
would be quite beyond the pale of this Court's
proper function in our federal system." Id. 385
at 567-568. (Footnotes omitted)
Two years after the Kelbach case the United States
Supreme Court made the definitive statement on the
unconstitutionality of unitary verdict proceedings in capital cases. The case was M cGautha v. California, and
Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.
2d 711 ( 1971). In McGautha, the court observed:
"The Constitution requires no more than that
trials be fairly conducted and that guaranteed
rights of defendants be scrupulously respected
from a constitutional standpoint we cannot conclude that it is impermissible for a State. to consider that the compassionate purposes of JUry sen-
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in
cases are better served by having
the issues of gwlt and punishment determined in
a single trial than by focusing the jury's attention
solely on punishment after the issue of guilt has
been determined." 402 U.S. at 221.
Commenting specifically on the latitude given juries
under the unitary verdict system, the Court said:
"In 'light' of history, experience, and the present limitations of human knowledge, we find it
quite impossible to say that committing to the
untramelled discretion of the jury the power to
pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive
to anything in the Constitution. The States are
entitled to assume that jurors confronted with the
truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death
for a fell ow human will act with due regard for
the consequences of their decision and will consider a variety of factors, many of which will have
been suggested by the evidence or by the arguments of defense counsel. For a court to attempt
to catalog the appropriate factors in this elusive
area could inhibit rather than expand the scope
of consideration, for no list of circumstances would
ever be really complete." 402 U.S. at 207-208.
Other jurisdictions have on numerous occasions since
M cGautha v. California upheld as constitutional the unitary verdict procedure. In Roman v. Parrish, 328 F.
Supp. 882 ( E.D. Va. 1971), appellants petition on this
issue was withdrawn after the M cGautha decision came
down. Other such holdings are found in State v. Kassow,
28 Ohio St. 2d 141, 277 N.E. 2d 435 ( 1971) ; State v.
Anderson, 28 Ohio App.2d 234, 277 N.E. 2d 64 ( 1971);
State v. Terry, 472 S.W. 2d 426 (Mo. 1971); State v.
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Thompson, 59 N.J. 396, 283 A.2d 513 ( 1971); and State
v. Boggs, 80 Wash. 2d 427, 495 P.2d 321 (1972).

In opposition to this mass of authorities, Appellant
cites not the language, not the holding, but the effect of
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.
2d 346 ( 1972), along with a hypothetical fact situation.
The Furman decision states nothing of overruling Crampton v. Ohio, and was specifically directed to verdicts
placing defendants on death row, not to verdicts of life
imprisonment. The United States Supreme Court further explained its holding in Furman in a recent case,
Robinson v. Neil, ··-- U.S. ____ , 93 S.Ct. 876, 35 L.Ed.2d
29 ( 1973):
"In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),
our mandate was tailored so as to deny to the
State only the authority to impose a punishment
which we held unconstitutional, without the
necessity of a redetermination of the factual question of whether the offense had in fact been committed. Thus the prejudice to the State resulting
from the necessity of an entire new trial because
of procedures newly found to be constitutionally
defective, with the attendant difficulties of again
rounding up witnesses whose memories would of
necessity be dimmer for the second trial than for
the first, was not present. That which was
tutionaly invalid could be isolated. and exc1s.ed
without requiring the State to begm the entire
factfinding process anew." 98 S.Ct. at 878.
Appellant creates an interesting hypothetical situation and then, without authorities to guide this Court
and without any proof that the facts in the case before
the Court were as stated in the hypothet, contends that

58
such a hypothet violated Appellant's Due Process rights.
Such conjecture is no basis for holding Utah's unitary
verdict system unconstitutional, particularly in light of
the United States Supreme Court cases, the Utah Supreme Court cases, and the cases from other jurisdictions
squarely opposed to Appellant's contentions.
On the weight of the authorities indicated above, and
particularly on the weight of this Court's own words in
State v. Kelbach, supra, this Court should affirm the
constitutionality of Utah's unitary verdict system and
deny the appeal.
POINT XI
REFERENCE BY A WITNESS TO THE FACT THAT
SIMS HAD BEEN GRANTED A NEW TRIAL WAS NOT
PREJUDICIAL ENOUGH TO CALL FOR REVERSAL.

Respondent contends that the statement made by
Robert Yockey (T. 506) was not prejudicial in that it
was not intended by the prosecution and was properly
stricken by the Court. The jury was instructed to erase
it from their minds and the presumption is that they
followed these instructions. Also, the implications of a
new trial were likely not understood by the lay jury.
The transcript is clear in elucidating that the prose·
cution had no intention to bring out anything that would
carry a reference that appellant had once before been
convicted of this same crime ( T. 507-508). It cannot be
said that this was a trial tactic designed to prejudice the
defendant in the eyes of the jury. The relevant portions
of Robert Yockey's testimony were sufficient to do that
on their own.
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When the phrase "new trial" is mentioned to one
unlearned in the law, connotations derived therefrom
may be voluminous. They may feel that this new trial
is a natural evolution from old preliminary trial, carrying
with it no reference to conviction. Perhaps something
happened in the former trial that brought it to a halt
prior to judgment and hence this "new trial" was necessary. There may have been an error during a previous
trial which necessitated starting over but this carries with
it no implication that the defendant was ever found guilty.
Perhaps the State moved for a new trial. The members
of a jury simply do not know the procedure involved. In
this situation, the mention of a new trial might be favorable to defendant. Clearly, we cannot, as a matter of
law, assume that it was prejudicial - particularly to the
point of reversing a judgment based on a long series of
evidentiary circumstances and retrying the entire case.
Utah case law is rather vacant on this specific point,
but in a first degree murder case with similar events
occurring in the late 1800's, the United States Supreme
Court in affirming the Utah Supreme Court made some
law that is still being cited today. In H opt v. Utah, supra,
point VIII, the Court said this:
"On the final argument to the jury, the counsel for the prosecution alluded to the case as the
most remarkable one ever tried in the Territory,
and to 'the many times it had been
before
the tribunals.' To this latter remark exception was
taken. Thereupon the remark was withdrawn by
the counsel, and the court said to the jury that the
case was to be tried on the evidence, and that they
were not to consider it with respect to any prev1-
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ous trial, but only on the evidence given on this
trial. The counsel for the defendant now contends
that this allusion was in contravention of that
section of the Act of the Territory regulating proceedings in criminal cases, which declares that
'The granting of a new trial places the parties in
the same position as if no trial had been had,'
and that 'all the testimony must be produced
anew, and the former verdict cannot be used or
ref erred to either in evidence or in argument.'
Laws of Utah 1878, p. 126, §317. The object of
this law was to prevent the accused from being
prejudiced by reference to any former conviction
on the same indictment. There was, in fact, no
reference to any verdict on a previous trial, but
merely a mention of the times the case had been
before the courts, so as to magnify its importance.
If allusions to previous trials, such as were here
made, were to vitiate a subsequent trial, a new element of uncertainty would be introduced into the
administration of justice in criminal cases. We do
not see that the defendant was in any way prejudiced by such reference. The fact that previous
trials had proved unavailing may perhaps have
induced greater care and caution on the part of
the jury in the consideration of the case." Id. at
442.
A recent case more nearly on point in another state
court was held for the State of Delaware on similar
reasoning. In Donlon v. State, 293 A.2d 575 (Del. 1972),
we read:
"Appellant's next point is that the pol.ice of.ficer, while testifying, mentioned the earlier
held in Municipal Court. He argues that the Jury
undoubtedly realized from that remark that he
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had been found guilty in the lower court, otherwise this trial would not have taken place.

*

*

*

[ t] here is nothing in the record to indicate
that the officer had a deliberate intent to inform
the jury of the prior trial. No further reference
was made to it in the testimony.

*

*

*

"Here, as the States suggests, the matter is of
such slight consequence, when considered in context, that we cannot believe that it had any substantial influence on the jury. It is of insufficient
importance to require a new trial."
In our case, the court went further in specifically admonishing the jury to "disregard it entirely as though
they had never heard it." This procedure is accepted and
followed by courts throughout the nation as being the
proper and most effective way to deal with evidence
that is deemed should never have come to the ears of the
jury. To rule the necessity of a new trial in such circumstances would make our courts into the playing floor of
a game wherein either side could bring it to a halt by
saying an insinuating phrase and where any error whatsoever would call all players back to Square one. That
cannot be allowed to happen.

For these reasons, the State can find no reason to
call for a reversal based on this contention.
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POINT XII
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE REC.
ORD TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S VERDICT, THE JURY
WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED AS TO THE BURDEN OF
PROOF ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND APPELLANT'S EXCEPTION TO JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON REA.
SONABLE DOUBT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
ARE NOT TIMELY.

This Court has clearly set forth appellant review
standards. In State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 P. 55
( 1929), where a second degree burglary conviction was
affirmed, this Court stated:
" ... As we view the testimony, the contention
made that the evidence is insufficient to justify
the verdict is wholly untenable. This court, on
appeal from conviction, cannot weigh the evidence, and has held in effect that in the absence
of legislation to the contrary, the appellate court
has no right to say what quantum of evidence
shall be necessary to establish a given fact or set
of facts, so long as there is substantial evidence in
support of such fact or facts." (Citations omitted)
(Emphasis added.) 74 Utah at 265.
Thirty years later in affirming the jury's guilty verdict
in a rape case, State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P.2d
865 ( 1959), this Court indicated more explicitly at PP·
39-40 what this "substantial evidence" test is.
The rules governing the scope of r_eview on
appeal as to the sufficiency of the
to
sustain the verdict are well settled; that It IS the
prerogative of the jury to j\ldge the credibility of
the witnesses and to determme the facts; that the
evidence will be reviewed in the light most favor-
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able to the verdict; and that if when so viewed
it appears
the jury acting fairly and reasonably could fmd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed.
This test was also set forth in State v. Evans, 74 Utah
389, 392, 279 P. 950 ( 1929), where a third degree burglary conviction was reversed on other grounds; State v.
Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 112, 307 P .2d 212 ( 195 7), where
a second degree burglary conviction was affirmed; State
v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 214, 357 P.2d 183 ( 1960),
where a verdict of negligent homicide was affirmed; and
State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 ( 1970),
where a conviction for second degree murder under the
felony murder rule was affirmed. At this Court stated in
Schad:
"Unless upon our review of the evidence, and
the reasonable inferences fairly to be deduced
therefrom, it appears that there is no reasonable
basis therein for such a conclusion, we should not
overturn the verdict." (Citations omitted.) 24
Utah 2d at 257.
Is there in the facts presented below a "reasonable
basis" upon which the jury could convict? Appellant
contends that the State's most damaging evidence was
'thoroughly rebutted." This is not so as a closer examination of the testimony clearly indicates.
1. While appellant had a valid reason for going to
the Patterson apartment the first time, the circumstances
of his proven second visit to the apartment infer some
predetermined course of action about which he was perhaps nervous. Consider appellant's first comments after
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the eight year old Gerald finally answered the door, "Is
your mom home?" (T. 341). Appellant knew full well
that Gerald's mother was at the hospital because appellant had taken her there and knew she worked until
7 : 00 a.m. ( T. 240) . There is the further testimony by
Robert Yockey that appellant confessed in an informal
conversation in jail that he left the wallet in the Patterson aparment with the intent of returning and "hustling"
the baby sitter, Linda Huntsman (T. 675-676).
Appellant contends in his brief at 95 that "the only
evidence as to the time of death indicated that the victim
was still alive when Sims left the second time." The only
evidence of the time appellant returned to pick up his
wallet comes from Gerald, who only states that it was
dark outside (T. 340) and from Robert Yockey, who
states only that it was after appellant had taken Mrs.
Patterson to work (T.675-676) and could have been
twenty minutes to an hour later (T. 707). Without evi·
dence to pinpoint more exactly when appellant returned
to the Patterson apartment, one cannot say that "the vie·
tim was still alive when Sims left the second time." Ac·
cording to Yockey's testimony, the only testimony that
gives an idea of when appellant returned, Linda Hunts·
man was dead when appellant left after picking up his
wallet (T. 708).
2. The State did not contend that the sole means of
placing appellant in the room where the murder occurred
was that appellant had type "A" blood, which type blood
and semen were found in the murder room. As to the
allegation that "some leading writers" consider evidence
of blood type too prejudicial and too lacking in proba·
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tive value to be admitted, appellant fails to assist the
Court by naming these writers and citing their works.
The fact was clearly made known to the jury that 40
percent of the people in the United States have "A" type
blood (T. 585). It was the province of the jury to decide
what weight should be given to appellant's blood type as
well as to the fact that Brian Jessop also had type "A"
blood. A mere alternative possibility does not thoroughly
rebutt a proven fact.
3. Appellant's reference to the small number of fibers
from appellant's levis, levi jacket, and shorts found to
be identical to fibers from the blanket under which the
victim was found, does not obviate the fact that such
fibers were on appellant's clothes. Appellant refers to
these fibers as being "highly mobile," but Robert E. Neill,
an F.B.I. expert on fibers, testified that such fibers would
not float more than one foot if dropped in the air (T.
614). Appellant may have been in the Patterson apartment containing the source blanket, Exhibit 23), but
he had not been in the bedroom where blanket was since
February 12, over a month previously. As to Appellant's
contact with Charlene Patterson who had been in the
bedroom and had sat on the blanket, Mrs. Patterson
testified that before Appellant kissed her she put on a
coat (T. 236) which was a long coat with long sleeves.
(T. 265). She also did not touch him until she gave him
a quick kiss before running into the hospital ( T. 240).
Mr. Neill also testified that secondary transfers, that is
from a cloth that his picked up a fiber to a third cloth,
are less certain to occur than the initial transfer. (T. 608).

66
None of this contact in the Patterson apartment or
with Mrs. Patterson explains the fibers found on Appellant's short, which Mr. Neill testified were identical to
those found on the blanket (T. 595, 600), unless Appellant took his levis off while in the Patterson apartment,
a presumption supporting the State's case. Appellant's
father indicated that Appellant had taken a bath after
dinner that evening (T. 834). Would Appellant have put
on dirty shorts? The presumption is that he put on clean
shorts.
4. Appellant's contention that deputies accompanying Appellant into his bedroom with his permission were
making an "illegal detour" has been proven false in
Point I.
Appellant's contention that "None of the other three
officers then in the same room saw any such thing," is
without proof. Mr. Bernardo indicated that he was with
Detectives Forbes, Cannon, and Wall (T. 463). The only
one of those three to testify was Detective Forbes whose
testimony was that although he did not see the black
turtlenecked shirt when he glanced that direction, Detective Bernardo indicated that such a shirt was there by
asking Appellant a question about it (T. 536-537). Testimony was also given by Charlene Patterson (T. 184, 235),
Brian Jessop (T. 624), and Helen Steyl (T. 793, 795,
796) that Appellant was wearing a black turtlenecked
shirt the evening of March 22. This was contrary to
Appellant's comments to Detective Bernardo (T. 481,
508) that the clothes he was putting on, including a red
plaid shirt, were the clothes he had worn the night before.
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Detective Bernardo's testimony about the black
turtle-neck shirt was supported by sufficient other testimony for the jury to conclude that he was telling the
truth.
5. Elissa Snow, who testified that Appellant had had
intercourse with her four nights before, could not positively identify the levis that Appellant wore that night
as the same levis he wore March 22, which levis were
presented into evidence in court with the semen spot on
the leg ( T. 1118) . There was further problem with her
testimony in that she claimed to know exactly what
Appellant wore March 18th and March 22nd, but could
not remember what he wore on March 8th, March 9th
or 10th, or on a third date between March 9th or 10th
and March 19th when Appellant visited her or gave her
a ride ( T. 1114) . The only occassions she could remember
what Appellant was wearing were March 19th and
March 22nd (T. 1115). It is not logical that she would
be that much more observant on those two particular
days.
There is indeed substantial basis for the jury to believe the State's theory that Appellant got the semen on
his levis when he raped Linda Hutnsman. Mr. Yockey's
testimony of Appellant's confession indicates that the
State's theory is in fact what happened. The fact that
drops of semen were also found on the victim's panties
(T. 5 75-5 76) and on the sheet on which she was lying
( T. 5 76) indicate the probability that Appellant dripped
on his own clothing, which probability the semen on Appellant's levis substantiates.
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Helen Steyl testified that Appellant came in the Sandpiper Lounge at "about eleven-thirty" and then more
specifically, "eleven-thirty," not at 11: 25 as Appellant
claims at 97 of his brief. Miss Steyl said she looked at
the clock to fix the time ( T. 790, 796, 799-800) but she
also indicated that she had had a telephone conversation with Detective Bernardo on March 27th. Detective
Bernardo testified that according to his memory and his
notes, Miss Steyl told him on that occasion that she was
"more or less guessing at the time." She never indicated
to Detective Bernardo that she looked at the clock to
fix the time either when Appellant or when Lou Arnold
came in. Since that was only five days from the night,
a reasonable assumption is that she remembered more
accurately then than eight months later during the trial.
This is particularly true in light of her comments that
on March 27th she knew appellant was charged with
murder, "still didn't believe it," and was trying as best
she could to recall (T. 805).
Lou Arnold testified that he arrived at the Sandpiper
Lounge "Just shortly after eleven-thirty" but later admitted testifying during a hearing in August to arriving
"about twelve o'clock" (T. 1186).
Appellant's mother testified that she heard Appellant
come home about 1 : 24 or 1 : 26 a.m. (T. 809) and that
she saw Appellant at least three other times during the
night (T. 810, 811). However, Detective Bernardo testified that according to his memory and according to his
notes, Mrs. Sims told him on March 23rd when he was
questioning her that she had not heard Appellant come
in, that her husband might have, and that she seldom
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heard Appellant come in because she took medication
for a heart condition (T. 1165). The pattern of Mrs.
Sims' testimony at 824 also casts doubt on the reliability
of her testimony.
MR BANKS: Q. Now, actually during this period of time you were under heavy medication,
weren't you?
A. (MRS. SIMS) : Yes.

MR BARBER: Objection. That calls for a conclusion.
MR. BANKS: She knows whether she was or not.
MR BARBER: May not know what heavy medication is, nor may the jury.
MR. BANKS: I'll never know unless she answers
it.
THE COURT: You may answer yes or no.
MR. BANKS: Q. You were under heavy medication?

A. (MRS. SIMS): No. I was not.
Mrs. Sims, who has an obvious interest in seeing that
her son is not convicted, seems to have responded to
defense counsel's objection by changing her answer to
the question.
Appellant's father, Loren J. Sims, testified that he
went to bed at 12: 00 (T. 834) but was up shortly after
1 : 00 when Appellant came home ( T. 834), 1 : 30 by the
clock (T. 835). There are problems with Mr. Sims'
testimony, though. He testified that he saw Appellant
up at 3: 00 a.m. and that the kitchen light was on (T.
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836). Later he testified in direct contradiction that he
did not see or hear Appellant get up during the night (T.
865, 866) and admitted that he had testified in a previous hearing that he did not hear the floor squeak that
night, that he did not see Appellant again that night
after the conversation when Appellant came home, that
he did not hear the water taps in the kitchen turned on,
and that he did not see any lights on in the kitchen that
night (T. 878-879). Again one finds the same trend that
the testimony gets better with the second hearing, despite
the fact that a witness' memory would logically be better
in August five months after the incident than in November, eight months after the murder.
Clearly, after viewing the State's evidence and considering the testimony which throws doubt on testimony
of defense witnesses, there is a substantial basis for the
jury's guilty verdict. That verdict should be affirmed.
As this Court indicated in State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365,
120P.2d 285 (1941), reh. denied March 24, 1942,
"It is not necessary that each circumstance in
itself establish the guilt of the defendant, but the
whole chain of circumstances, taken together, must
produce the required proof. (Citations omitted.)
"On the other hand, if there is any substantial evidence which satisfies the above requirements, then the weight of the evidence is for the
jury, and the Court will not disturb the verdict."
(Citations omitted.) 101 Utah at 401.
There is substantial evidence here. Yockey testified
Appellant admitted the crime. Physical evidence from
Appellant's clothing and the crime scene corroborated
that Appellant had been in the bedroom in contact with
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the blanket found covering the victim and could have left
semen on the sheet and the victim's panties as he left
semen on his levis. This Court should not disturb the
jury's verdict.
At 98 in his brief, Appellant proffers a "reasonable
alternative explanation."
This Court has indicated a number of times that in
cases where much, if not all, of the evidence is circumstantial, the court must instruct the jury that every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is to be excluded by
such evidence or the defendant should be found not
guilty. State v. Burch, 100 Utah 414, 417, 115 P.2d 911
( 1941); People v. Scott, 10 Utah 217, 37 P. 335 ( 1894);
State v. Erwin, 101Utah365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941). The
court below so instructed the jury in Instruction 16 (mistakenly referred to by Appellant as Instruction 15 as it
was Instruction 15 in the first trial held in August) .
If the evidence in this case can be interpreted
or explained on any reasonable ground other than
the guilt of the defendant, you must find him not
guilty.

Appellant in his brief misinterprets this instruction to
mean that if there is any statement or combination of
statements from the witnesses which, if believed in their
entirety, would indicate that the defendant is not guilty,
the jury must find him not guilty, despite their personal
beliefs. In State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 110,
307 P. 2d 212 ( 195 7) , this Court explained the standard.
" [I] t is not sufficient merely that reasonable
minds may have entertained such doubt. Before a
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verdict may properly be set aside, it must appear
that the evidence was so inconclusive or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds acting fairly upon
it must have entertained reasonable doubt that defendants committed the crime. Unless the evidence
compels such conclusion as a matter of law, the
verdict must stand. The very essence of trial by
jury is that the jury are the exclusive judges of
the weight of the evidence, the credibility of the
witnesses and the facts to be found therefrom."
6 Utah 2d at 114 (Emphasis in the original.)
The phrase in Instruction No. 16, "interpreted or
explained on any reasonable ground" merely indicates
that the jury should decide the reasonable explanation
when there is conflicting testimony. The jury did not find
appellant's defenses reasonable and found him guilty instead. The evidence plainly supports this verdict and is
not so unsatisfactory that "reasonable minds acting fairly
upon it must have entertained reasonable doubt." The
quantum of evidence presented by the State is clearly
superior to that presented in United States v. Corso, 439
F .2d 956 ( 1971 ) , and the lower court made no prejudicial instruction as did the United States District Court
in the Corso case, and that case should not be applied to
this fact situation by this court.
Appellant's "reasonable alternative explanation" also
contains factual problems. Mrs. Sims at no time testified
that appellant sat on the gold couch in his shorts. The
blood which was found on Appellant's levis was found
on the left leg ( T. 5 78) while Elissa Snow with her
bloody toe sat on his right (T. 1123). If any blood were
to get on Appellant's levis from Miss Snow's toe, it is
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much more probable the blood would have gotten on
his right leg. Other problems with the facts as presented
by Appellant are indicated earlier in this point.
Appellant objects in his brief at 98 to the lower
court's instructions on reasonable doubt and circumstantial evidence, claiming them to be confusing. As has
been noted supra at Points V and VIII, when no exception was taken to the jury instruction at the time of the
trial, the objection is not preserved for argument on appeal. Appellant's objections to these instructions are not
timely and should not be allowed on appeal.
As the Court commented in State v. Schad, 24 Utah
2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 ( 1970) supra, such crimes as this
are committed in utmost secrecy and pose great problems
for those seeking the culprits. This Court should do as
they did on that occasion, affirm the jury verdict on
evidence sufficient "to justify reasonable minds in believing his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 24 Utah 2d
at 258. There is clearly sufficient evidence here.
POINT XIII
THE INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL OF THIS CASE
PROVIDED APPELLANT WITH THAT FAIRNESS TO
WHICH HE IS ENTITLED UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED ST ATES CONSTITUTION.
A. APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO EVIDENCE OF HIS
BLOOD TYPE IS UNTIMELY AND WITHOUT SUBSTANTIVE MERIT.

Appellant contends that evidence of his blood type
resulting from a blood sample taken from him should
be excluded as a violation of the exclusionary rule, since
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previous evidence of blood type was obtained under a
defective warrant, and as a violation of his right against
self incrimination. Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states :
A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor
shall the judgment or decision based thereon be
reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of
evidence unless (a) there appears of record objection to the evidence timely interposed and so
stated as to make clear the specific ground of objection, and ( b) the court which passes upon the
effect of the error or errors is of the opinion that
the admitted evidence should have been excluded
on the ground stated and probably had a substantial influence in bringing about the verdict or finding. However, the court in its discretion, and in
the interests of justice, may review the erroneous
admission even though the grounds of the ob jection thereto are not correctly stated. (Emphasis
added.)
During the trial, Lynn H. Davis testified that he
had removed a sample of blood from Appellant and had
found it to be Type A with positive RH factors (T. 538541). Defense counsel raised neither of the objections
indicated above, but made a prefunctory objection that
this evidence was "hearsay - relies on hearsay." (T. 539540). This objection clearly fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 4. The objection does not "make clear
the specific grounds of objection" that the Appellant now
relies on.
This Court has the power to "review the erroneous
admission even though the grounds of the objection
thereto are not correctly stated,'' but to do so in this
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instance would be to act contrary to what obviously was
the intent of the rule. To preserve the integrity of the
trial court's process, the trial judge must be given the
opportunity to handle the objection to eliminate the
necessity of reversal for grounds on which the trial judge
never had a chance to rule.
Even if this Court were to review the admission it
would find it nonprejudicial, and therefore to be ignored
on appeal. Utah Code Ann. §77-42-1 (1953). There was
other evidence admitted during the trial to indicate that
Appellant's blood type was A. Mr. Robert Beams testified that he had received a pair of levis which were being
worn by the Appellant at the time of his arrest, that he
tested a semen spot on the right leg of those levis, and
that the person who deposited that semen on the levis
had type A blood ( T. 5 77, 586-587). Defense counsel produced a witness who admitted to having sexual intercourse with the Appellant while he was wearing similar
levis ( T. 1111-1112). Appellant himself argues at Point
XII of his brief that the spot of semen on his pants came
from him during the sexual act mentioned above. There
was ample evidence for the jury to conclude that Appellant had A type blood without the testimony concerning
the blood test to which Appellant now objects.
This Court should deny Appellant's objection to the
blood type evidence as untimely, as not being based on
a properly specific objection in the trial court, and as
non-prejudicial.
Appellant's objection is also without basis in substantive law. Neither the exclusionary rule nor the right
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against self-incrimination require that evidence of blood
tests be withheld from the jury.
Appellant argues that the exclusionary rule set forth
in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.
2d 1181 ( 1961 ) requires the exclusion of the blood test
evidence since previous blood test evidence was obtained
under a defective warrant. The exclusionary rule has
never required that new evidence obtained under a valid
warrant separate and distinct from the evidence obtained
under an invalid warrant, must be excluded because it
indicates what the previous evidence indicated. If the
issuance of a new warrant, the taking of the blood, and
the testing thereof took place with the same blood, the
evidence may be inadmissible. The Mapp decision indicated that state courts must exclude illegally seized evidence from criminal prosecutions. Here, the evidence was
not illegally seized. There is not even any evidence in
the record that Appellant resisted the taking of the blood
sample. The second blood test was a separate event
based on a valid warrant covering entirely new evidence
and was properly admitted by the trial judge.
Appellant contends secondly that Article I, § 12, of
the Constitution of Utah is broader in its scope than the
language of he Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution since Section 12 uses the phrase "compelled
to give evidence against himself" which is the Fifth
Amendment. The Washington Court in State v. Moore,
79 Wash. 2d 51, 483 P.2d 630 ( 1971), indicated that
the federal provisions and Washington State's provisions,
under Art. I, §9 which has the same language as Utah's
Art. 5, § 12, provide identical protection although worded
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differently. The majority of courts in jurisdictions where
this question had arisen have found the state and federal
self-incrimination statutes to be identical in application
though different in form, as will be shown after an overview of the federal law on excluding blood tests as selfincrimina tory.
The right against self-incrimination arises first of
all from the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution which provides that "No person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself," which Nlalloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct.
1489, 12 L.Ed. 653 ( 1964), held applied not only in
federal but also in state criminal proceedings.
In applying the privilege against self-incrimination,
state and federal coutrs have distinguished between compelling "communication" or "testimony," unconstitutional, and compelling a suspect or accused to the source of
"real or physical evidence." Holt v. United States, 218
U.S. 245, 31 S.Ct. 2, 54 L.Ed 1021 ( 19) ; Breithaupt v.
Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 77 S.Ct. 408, 1 L.Ed. 2d 448
( 1957).

The specific question of whether the taking of blood
against one's will and its introduction into evidence violated Fifth Amendment guarantees against self-incrimination was answered by the Supreme Court in Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed. 2d
908 ( 1966). The Court held that blood test evidence is
"real" or "physical" evidence and does not violate the
privilege against self-incrimination by compelling "communication" or "testimony."
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"We hold that the privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against
himself, or othenvise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature
and that the withdrawal of blood and use of
analysis in question in this case did not involve
compulsion to these ends. 86 S.Ct. at 1830-1831.
Not even a shadow of testimonial compulsion
upon or enforced communication by the accused
was involved either in the extraction or in the
chemical analysis. Petitioner's testimonial capacities were in no way implicated; indeed, his participation, except as a donor, was irrelevant to
the results of the test, which depend on chemical
analysis and on that alone. Since the blood test
evidence, although an incriminating product of
compulsion, was neither petitioner's testimony nor
evidence relating to some communicative act or
writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible
on privilege grounds." 86 S.Ct. at 1832-1833.

If the Utah constitutional provision from Article I,

§ 12, that "the accused shall not be compelled to give

evidence against himself" is found to be the same as the
Fifth Amendment provision, the Schmerber case will be
controlling.
There is no case directly on point in Utah. Rule 23 ( 3)
of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
" ( 3 ) An accused in a criminal action h:1s no
privilege to refuse, when ordered by the 1udge,
to submit his body to examination or to do any
act in the presence of the judge or the trier of
fact, except to refuse to testify except. that. he
shall not be required to give evidence agamst him-
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self, as provided by Section 12, Article 1, Constitution of Utah."
Appellant refers to State v. Sirmay, 40 Utah 525, 122

P. 748 ( 1912) as interpreting Art. I, § 12, to forbid use

of compelled action which make the defendant the source
of evidence against himself, such as making a defendant
place his shoes in footprints to see if they match. A
careful reading of the Sirmay decision shows the comments by the Court at 536-537 to be dicta, general comments about the statement of the law allowing the use of
evidence "obtained in a criminal case by unfair or illegal
methods . . . if relevant, provided the accused is not
thereby compelled to do any act which incriminates
him. . . . " These comments were not necessary to the
holding as the Court found "the evidence here shows that
the defendant was not compelled to take off his shoes or
to surrender them to the sheriff against his will," and
affirmed the first degree murder verdict returned by the
JUry.

Appellant fails to show, either through testimony during the trial or through allegations in his brief on appeal,
that he was "compelled" to submit to the blood test.
Under the doctrine of Sirmay outlined above, when there
is no showing of coercion the evidence is admissible, as
12 reads, "The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself." (Emphasis added.)
Even if Appellant was "compelled," the Texas court
under Art. I, 10, a "giving evidence" provision like
Utah's, held in Olson v. State, 484 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1972), that compulsion of blood tests is constitutional if it comports with due process. The Pennsyl-
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vania court held that compulsory blood examination was
constitutional in a rape prosecution, Commonwealth v.
Statti, 166 Pa. Super. 577, 73 A.2d 688 (1950), later
confirming in a driving while intoxicated fact situation,
that blood taken from a defendant momentarily incapable
of consent was admissible, Commonwealth v. Tanchyn,
200 Pa. Super. 148, 188 A.2d 824 (1963). In State v.
Greene, 12 N.C.App. 687, 184 S.E.2d 523 (1971), a
forgery prosecution, the North Carolina court held that
handwriting samples, blood samples, fingerprints, clothes,
hair, and similar evidence are outside protections against
self-incrimination. North Carolina's Art. I, § 11 uses the
phrase, "give self-incriminating evidence," similar to
the language in Utah's Art. I, §12.
In State v. Spencer, 28 Utah 2d, 497 P.2d 636 ( 1972)
this Court found that although the defendant was compelled to participate in a line-up and to repeat certain
words, " [ t] he defendant by his participation in the line·
up was not compelled to give evidence against himself,
nor was he compelled to be a witness against himself."
28 Utah 2d at 13-14.

Besides the courts, Virginia, Art I, §8, Walton v. City
of Roanoke, 204 Va. 678, 133 S.E.2d 315 (1963); Nebraska, Art. I, §12, State v. Williams, 189 Neb. 127, 201
N.W.2d 241 (1972) and State v. Manley, 189 Neb. 415,
202 N.W.2d 831 ( 1972) ; Maryland, Art. 22 of the Decla·
ration of Rights, Mauldin v. State, 239 Md. 592, 212
A.2d 502 ( 1965); and Arizona, Art. 2, § 10, Campbell v.
Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 ( 1971) have
held implied consent statutes constitutional under the
provisions listed above which are similar to Utah's Art. I,
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§12. These cases all involved taking blood samples to
determine intoxication under charges of driving while
intoxicated or automobile homicide.
Blood test evidence is "real" evidence and should not
be excluded. The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions
with constitutional language similar to Utah's have found
blood tests to be outside the constitutional guarantees
against "testimonial" self-incrimination. Respondents submit that this Court should follow these precedents.
For all of the reasons indicated above, this Court must
find Appellant's contentions without legal merit.
B. APPELLANT'S ALLEGATION OF BEING DENIED A
FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE OF SLOPPY POLICE INVESTIGATION IS WITHOUT MERIT.

Appellant's assertion that he was "effectively required
to defend against all crimes committed that night" is
without merit. Appellant was tried for only one crime,
the felony-murder of Linda Huntsman. It was well established by testimony that the crime was committed and
death occurred between 11 :00 p.m. on March 22, 1971,
and 7 :00 a.m. on March 23, 1971 (T. 190-191). Requiring Appellant to account for his whereabouts those
eight hours was not unfair to Appellant. Witnesses for
the defense attempted to establish Appellant's whereabouts from approximately 11 :30 (T. 790, 1182)
throughout the night (T. 809-812, 834-835). As this
Court, in State v. Spencer, 28 Utah 2d 12, 497 P.2d 636
(1972), stated at 13,
The defendant called witnesses to support his
defense of an alibi. The evidence adduced for that
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purpose would indicate that the defendant could
not have been at the scene of the robbery at the
time it was committed. However, it would appear
that the jury were not impressed by the defend·
ant's claim that he was elsewhere at the time of
the crime.
Because evidence presented by the State may be diffj.
cult to rebutt does not mean that the trial was unfair to
Appellant. Appellant's argument is without merit and
should be dismissed as such by the Court.
C. APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS TO MR. YOCKEY'S TESTIMONY ARE WITHOUT MERIT.

Appellant's version of Robert Y ockey's testimony at
107 and 108 of his brief is not accurate, as the following
examples illustrate.
Yockey testified only that Gerald, the eight year old
son, answered the door (T. 677, 699) not that Appellant
range the doorbell. In fact both Mrs. Patterson (T. 192)
and her son Gerald (T. 341) testified that they had no
doorbell at the apartment.
Yockey testified that Appellant hollered at the baby
sitter, not that Gerald did so (T. 677, 700).
Yockey testified that he was never told how the victim
was strangled and that Appellant never said how he killed
the girl (T. 707), certainly not that he chocked her with
his hands until she died, as Appellant's version of Yockey's testimony states.
The medical examiner testified not only that the victim had one bruise consistent with a blow on the head
by a fist, as Appellant indicates at 107, but also that the
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victim could have been knocked out with a second blow
not sufficiently hard to cause a second bruise (T. 956-957,
965), consistent with Yockey's testimony that Appellant
struck the victim twice ( T. 709 ) . Defense counsel attem pted to get Yockey to state that the victim was hit
in the mouth, but Yockey, consistent with the testimony
of Dr. Weston, the medical examiner (T. 956-957), testified that the victim was hit on the head, not in the mouth
(T. 701, 702).
On cross examination with defense counsel zeroing in
on those specific elements of Yockey's testimony that he
considered inconsistent, Jay Edmonds still corroborated
Mr. Yockey's testimony about Appellant's leaving his wallet in the apartment on purpose, victim's awaking from
effects of the blow, while Appellant was making love to
her, and Appellant's striking the victim on the head twice
(T. 733-734). Mr. Edmonds further testified that Mr.
Yockey related the story without any questions or answers
from members of the District Attorney's staff (T. 373).
Mr. Yockey testified that he was never told about the
evidence in the case prior to giving his testimony (T.
1126) and that he had seen no pictures of the crime
(T. 1127).
This Court should consider the following elements of
Mr. Y ockey's testimony about which defense counsel,
knowing that these elements were supported by other
testimony, did not wish to ask.
The main thing that would appeal illogical about
Yockey's testimony is that appellant told him he had
committed the crime. There were two inmates who
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Yockey stated confessed to him, Craig Loren Sims and
Mark Richmond (T. 690, 648).
Mark Richmond corroborated Yockey's testimony,
stating that he talked to Yockey about the second degree
murder he was charged with and admitted to Yockey
that he had killed his wife (T. 752), as Jay Banks indi·
cated Yockey told him ( T. 733). Yockey also testified
that he told Yockey none of the details of the crime with
which he was charged (T. 752), which is exactly what
Yockey stated (T. 690). The fact that Mark Richmond
admitted his crime makes it more logical that appellant
admitted his.
Yockey testified that Appellant was in the living
room with the victim before he left with Mrs. Patterson
(T. 674-675), as did Mrs. Patterson (T. 187).
Yockey testified that Appellant took Mrs. Patterson
to the hospital (T. 674), as did Mrs. Patterson (T. 240).
Both Gerald Patterson (T. 342-343) and Mr. Yockey
(T. 675) testified that Appellant left his wallet in the
apartment, and that Gerald was the one who answered
the door (T. 340, 353, 676, 699).
Yockey (T. 675-677), Mrs. Patterson (T. 171-173),
and Gerald (T. 334, 335) all indicated that the girl who
was killed was the baby sitter.
There is other testimony that is consistent with and
supports the testimony given by Robert Yockey. Although
no robe was found at the murder scene on March 23,
1971, Brian Jessop testified that Linda, the victim, kept
a white robe with blue flowers on it at the Patterson
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aparment (T. 634), and that Linda always wore the robe
when she went to the door in the evening (T. 634-635).
That fact that an object was not at the murder scene
does not necessarily prove there was no such object there
earlier, but only indicates that the object was not at the
murder scene when the police investigated it. The perpetrator of the crime could easily have removed the robe
from the scene and disposed of it elsewhere.
On the morning of March 23rd, N. D. Hayward
questioned Gerald in the presence of his mother and
Karla Hogan, a nurse who worked with Mrs. Patterson.
At that time Gerald could not remember if he had closed
the door after the Appellant (T. 941-942). Mrs. Patterson also indicated that her son is a heavy sleeper (T. 193),
a fact further evidenced by the length of time Mrs. Patterson had to let the phone ring to wake Gerald in the
morning (T. 191, 273). After Appellant picked up his
wallet, he could have waited a few minutes until Gerald
was asleep again, walked in, committed the crime, and
then told Yockey that the crime took place in front of
the boy to make the story more dramatic or to make the
story appear questionable should Yockey ever tell anyone
what he had been told.
Appellant makes rather loose use of the word "perjury" particularly in light of the problems with testimony given by the following defense witnesses.
Mrs. Ercanbrack testified that she saw a man in white
clothes on the landing in front of the Patterson apartment (T. 914) and that she had seen the same fellow
in the parking lot earlier in the day (T. 915-916). However, three policemen, N. H. Hayward (T. 934, 935-36,
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951), William Oefinger (T.1162, 1160), and Benjamin
Forbes ( T. 11 77) , testified that when they asked Mrs.
Ercanbrack the morning of March 23rd when she should
have remembered best, she specifically stated that she
did not see anyone outside the Patterson residence when
she heard the knocking noises. N. D. Hayward further
testified that Mrs. Ercanbrack, when questioned on
March 23rd, said she returned home at 3: 30, but when
questioned on March 29th, she said she arrived home
at 2: 50 a.m. (T. 943, 945). During the trial she said
she got home at 1: 15 a.m. (T. 908). Mrs. Ercanbrack
also testified that when she saw the man in white pants
in the parking lot, he appeared to be talking to Mrs.
Patterson and her friend (T. 915-916). Mrs. Patterson
indicated that there was no one in the parking lot at that
time except the neighbors from apartment 6 who just
arrived in a taxi and the taxi driver (T. 249-250).
Mr. Sims testified that he saw the Appellant at 3 :00
that morning in the kitchen because the kitchen light
was on (T. 836). He then testified a few minutes later
that he did not see or hear Appellant get up later that
evening after seeing him come in a little after 1 : 00 a.m.
(T. 837, 878, 866). Mr. Sims also testified that he
doubted if he went to sleep all night (T. 864-865) and
that he could tell if the water or lights were turned on
(T. 875). He then said that he only heard his wife get
up once (T. 387). His wife testified that Appellant was
up in the kitchen to get a drink of water at 3: 30 that
morning (T. 810), that she herself was up at least three
times to get a glass of water or go to the bathroom (T.
819-822 and turned the bathroom light on at least twice
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(T. 820-821). If Appellant's father was awake all night,
and was able to hear and see if the water and lights were
turned on, why did he fail to hear his wife arise the
other two times, something difficult to do when one is
awake and in the same room if not same bed with someone else? Appellant's father admitted to testifying in an
earlier hearing that he would be able to hear anyone if
they got up, volunteering information about a squeaky
board in the hall that would give anyone away (T. 888890). Loren J. Sims also admitted, however, that he has
lost all hearing in his right ear (T. 837-838), cannot hear
anything when he sleeps on his left side and that he slept
on his left side at least part of the night (T. 838). Being
deaf-like that would make it very difficult for him to
hear everyone getting up as he said he could.

Besides the conflicts with her husband's testimony
pointed out above, there are problems with Mrs. Sim's
testimony. She swore that she heard Appellant come in
at either 1 : 24 or 1 : 26 a.m. and heard him talk to his
father, Loren J. Sims (T. 809). Detective Bernardo testified that he could remember and had taken notes of a
conversation with Mrs. Sims the morning of March 23rd
when she should have remembered best (T. 1170), during which she stated that she did not hear the Appellant come in the night before, that she was taking medication and seldom heard Appellant come in (T. 1165)
John Bernardo further testified Mrs. Sims said the medicine helped her sleep at night (T.1170).
Perhaps most revealing is the interchange dealing with
Mrs. Sims' medication which is reported above in Point
XII of Respondent's Brief (T. 824). Mrs. Sims first
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admitted to being "under heavy medication" but then
denied it after defense counsel made an objection, almos1
as if the subsequent denial were coached.
There was a conflict between the testimony of Helen
Steyl (T. 790) and her comments to John Bernardo over
the phone on March 27th (T. 1164), as indicated above
in Point XII of this brief.
There was a conflict between the testimony
Arnold gave at the trial in August (T. 1186) and the
testimony he gave during the November trial (T. 1182),
as indicated above in Point XII of this brief.
Appellant would be the first to argue that these "per·
juries" are just "inconsistencies" that are bound to occur
since human memories are not perfect. Respondent submits that if such is true of defense witnesses, the same
is true for the testimony of Robert Yockey in those de·
tails that cannot be corroborated by other evidence. As
has been shown above, the bulk of Mr. Yockey's testimony
can be supported by other testimony and reasonable in·
ferences from that testimony.
Even if the contrary were true and Yockey's testi·
mony were not corroborated, those who make up juries
are not incompetent to determine where the truth lies
and appellant was not damaged by Mr. Yockey's testimony. As this Court stated in State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah
2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957), at 114:
"The very essense of trial by jury is that the
jury are the exclusive judges of the weight of the
evidence, the credibility of the witnesses and the
facts to be found therefrom."

1
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If Yockey is prevaricating, the veniremen were intelligent enough to realize to discount his testimony.

Conflicts in testimony are to be resolved by defense
counsel's pointing out inconsistencies during cross-examination. To argue as appellant does that cross-examination
is not effective enough is to argue that jurors are not
competent to tell where the truth lies, a premise this
Court could never accept - as it would necessarily bring
an end to trial by one's peers. In State v. Jarett, 112 Utah
335, 178 P.2d 547 (1947), this Court stated at 340:
"On cross-examination the deputy sheriff testified that he was somewhat confused about the full
extent of the conversation with the defendant.
In addition, appellant points out minor discrepancies between the testimony given by some of the
witnesses at the trial and that given at the preliminary hearing. However, these uncertainties and inconsistent statements go only to the credibility of
the witnesses, and to the weight to be given to
their testimony. These are properly matters for
the jury's determination, and we assume were
considered by the jury during its deliberation."
The jury gave the deliberation to the State's witnesses
and to the appellant's witness, concluding that the truth
lay with the State's witnesses. This Court should hold
that appellant's argument is without medit, that the
question of credibility of Mr. Yockey's testimony, as with
the credibility of the defense witnesses, was for the jury
to consider in weighing the testimony and the evidence.
Appellant's arguments against the testimony of Mr.
Yockey are without merit and should not be allowed by
this Court.
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D. APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS TO THE POLICE IN.
VESTIGA TION ARE WITHOUT MERIT.

Appellant contends that the police investigation was
so shoddy as to deny Appellant his right to a fair trial.
Closer consideration of the specific allegations shows them
to be without merit.
Appellant first argues that the Salt Lake Police De·
partment should have tested for minor blood groups as
well as the major ones. When asked if the F.B.I. laboratory, the laboratory that did the testing, "could have determined more accurately than we have determined now
the possible source of those stains by doing those tests, is
that not correct?'', Mr. Robert Beams of that laboratory
stated, "It's not correct." (T. 581). Mr. Beams stated,
"We don't run these other blood group systems routinely
in the laboratory" (T. 581). When Dr. Weston was asked
if the semen found in the body of the victim could be
used for typing, Dr. Weston said that sperm cannot be
typed after it is mixed with the body fluids of the victim
(T. 968-969). There was no reason to fault the Salt Lake
Police for not testing for minor blood groups.
Appellant next argues that the police should have
investigated Mrs. Ercanbrack's story of the stranger
dressed in white. As indicated above in the comments
on the inconsistencies in Mrs. Ercanbrack's testimony,
William Oefinger (T. 1162), Benjamin Forbes (T. 1177),
and N. D. Hayward (T. 934-937, 945-946) all testified
that Mrs. Ercanbrack stated specifically that she saw
no one oustide the Patterson apartment. N. D. Hayward
testified further that if the police department had received a report of a man in white clothes, they would
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\. have conducted an investigation for that man (T. 948).
The police department should not be faulted for not
al investigating someone about whom they had heard
nothing and for whose existence the Appellant relies on
1].
m testimony with many inconsistencies. Appellant's arguments are without merit and should be dismissed as such
by this Court.
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CONCLUSION
The respondent submits that pursuant to the foregoing arguments and cited authorities there is no merit
to appellant's appeal; respondent therefore requests this
Court to deny appellant's appeal and affirm the lower
court's conviction of the appellant.
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